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INTRODUCTION 
Common law concepts have fallen into disrepute among legal theorists. 
The rise of Legal Realism in the early twentieth century marked a turning 
point in legal thought and analysis. One of the defining characteristics of 
the movement was complete disregard, not to say contempt, towards legal 
conceptualism.1 The founding fathers of the movement viewed the core 
concepts of the common law as devoid of any independent meaning or 
functional significance. 2  They considered the common law’s conceptual 
edifice indeterminate and manipulable so as to render it altogether contingent 
on the working of the system.3 Walking along the same path, efficiency-
minded scholars see the common law system as a collection of rules that are 
in reality motivated solely by the ideal of wealth maximization.4 In this 
view, legal concepts exist in the common law to further its economic goals, 
 
1 For a sample of the literature documenting this, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE  
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
200 (1992) (“Hostility to conceptualism was a hallmark of Legal Realist criticism.”); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN 
JUDGING 59 (2010); Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 335, 335-36 (1988); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. 
REV. 431, 447-48 (1930).  
2 As a perfect example, see Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935) (“Legal concepts . . . are supernatural entities which do not 
have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.”). For work contributing to this critique, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 45 (1990) (describing Judge 
Cardozo’s use of concepts as “bluff”); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 655 (1926).  
3 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 820; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law  
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1699 (1976). 
4 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 270-71 (7th ed. 2007); 
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
65, 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977). 
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or are otherwise completely redundant.5 Legal philosophers, for their part, 
have chimed in as well, characterizing the common law’s concepts as 
embodying their own autonomous commitment to reason, which they see as 
altogether independent from the instrumental goals of the law.6 With the 
general move towards instrumentalism in American legal analysis and 
thinking,7 the net result has been that common law concepts are seen today 
as largely vestigial artifacts.  
In this Article, we mount a defense of the common law’s architecture. 
We argue that the criticisms leveled by legal theorists at the common law’s 
extensive use of legal concepts are misguided. In treating the common law’s 
conceptual architecture as a contingent feature of the system, these criticisms 
fail to account for how the common law has endured over time and context, 
and in the face of changing social values and preferences. The persistence of 
the common law and its continuing vitality is in large measure attributable 
to the subtle balance that it achieves between stability and change, a balance 
for which it relies almost entirely on its conceptual structure. Our core 
thesis is that the common law’s commitment to its conceptual structure is in 
many ways the key to understanding not just how the common law works 
but, in addition, what the common law itself is.  
For the purposes of this Article, we define common law concepts as the 
operational legal devices that the common law uses in doctrine to understand and 
compartmentalize aspects of a legal issue or dispute. Concepts are in effect the 
building blocks of common law doctrine, its language of analysis, so to 
speak. It is through its concepts that the common law strikes a balance 
between stability and change, both of which are essential to the effective 
operation of a legal system. A legal system needs to be sufficiently stable in 
order to guide the behavior of its subjects. An ever-changing legal system 
would vitiate the expectations of its subjects and force them to constantly 
adjust to the oscillations of legal opinion, undermining its own legitimacy in 
the process.8 At the same time, however, a legal system that remains frozen 
in time would fail to respond to the changing needs of the citizenry and 
 
5 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 14 (1987) (arguing that the very tort concept of “fault” has an “economic rationale” and 
that the “doctrinal structure” of tort law can be seen as economic); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of 
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (arguing that Learned Hand’s formulation of the duty 
of care—the Hand Formula—was driven by economic considerations). 
6 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).  
7 See Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal 
Thought—A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 861, 862-63 (1981). 
8 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1997). 
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would invariably run afoul of its subjects’ ideals, values, and preferences.9 
Such a system too, much like the one that remains in a perpetual state of 
change, is likely to lose its claim to legitimacy and prove to be ineffective. 
As Justice Holmes famously said, it would be “revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV.”10 Stability and change in the law, while seemingly at odds with each 
other, are thus both central to a legal system’s claim to legitimacy—a 
concern that the common law takes very seriously.  
Common law concepts are uniquely designed to accommodate the seem-
ingly conflicting demands of stability and change. They perform this task by 
virtue of what we term their “duality of meaning.” Common law concepts 
have, at once, a jural meaning and a normative meaning. The jural meaning 
refers to the structural core undergirding a legal concept that enables its use 
by participants in legal discourse. This jural meaning is indeed what Wesley 
Hohfeld described as the “intrinsic meaning” of a legal concept in his 
famous taxonomy of jural conceptions and relations. 11  While the jural 
meaning forms the core of the concept, it is usually incapable of being 
applied to all situations and contexts by itself, owing to its intrinsic “open-
endedness.” It is the normative meaning of the concept that renders it 
applicable to a context. The normative meaning refers to the meaning that a 
legal concept and its jural meaning come to be cloaked in as a result of 
external interpretive influences, which may in turn be drawn from a variety 
of situational goals. The normative meaning does not displace the jural 
meaning of the concept but instead works in tandem with it to collectively 
enable the concept to be applied during adjudication. Over time, the two 
meanings work together, with the jural meaning producing the common 
law’s stability effect while the normative meaning allows the common law to 
accommodate changes in its values and goals. The jural meaning remains 
stable and operates as an anchor, enabling actors to build their expectations 
and plan their activities. At the same time, the open-ended nature of legal 
concepts renders them capable of accommodating different normative values 
and ideals. It is for this reason that most common law concepts are structured 
as legal standards (as opposed to rules).12 
 
9 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-51 (1921); 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923) (1881). 
10 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
11 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
23 YALE L.J. 16, 58 (1913).  
12 See, e.g., Norway Plains Co. v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267 (1854) (explaining 
that one of the great merits of the common law is that its structure relies on a few broad and 
comprehensive principles, as opposed to a series of detailed practical rules). For a discussion of 
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Examples are legion. Consider, first, the concept of “duty of care” in tort 
law. The core jural meaning of the concept is that an actor is under an 
obligation to avoid causing harm; this obligation is deemed significant 
enough to constrain his or her behavior. While scholars disagree on the 
scope and reach of this obligation—that is, on whether it is general or 
relative13— they generally agree on the actual structure of the duty as an 
obligation, which forms the jural correlative of a claim-right.14 Despite this 
common jural understanding of the concept, over the years scholars of tort 
law have continued to debate what exactly it is that a duty of care connotes 
as a normative matter. Some have argued that the obligation is a moral one, 
imposed on individuals in society to take care (and precautions) against 
causing harm to others that emanates from basic moral principles;15 others 
contend that it is nothing more than a device through which the law imposes 
liability on the cheapest cost avoider,16 or the party best positioned to bear 
the loss.17  
Consider, next, the concept of “touch and concern” in property law. The 
concept of “touch and concern” is the litmus test used by courts to determine 
whether a covenant binds third parties who did not directly agree to its 
existence.18 As an analytical matter, the jural meaning of “touch and concern” 
as a legal concept is indisputable: to bind third parties, the covenant must 
be related to the realty itself (i.e., to the res). As a normative matter, 
however, the concept of “touch and concern” has come to be imbued with 
different normative understandings. Some argue that it is little more than a 
mechanism allowing courts to police the contracting parties’ mutual intent 
and to determine the extent to which a third party’s autonomy can be 
 
rules and standards, see Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 29 
(1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992); 
and Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1776. 
13 See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 
(2008) (documenting the debate surrounding the concept); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, 
Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 282 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1829-30 (1998) (offering a relational 
conception of duty based on “relationships”). 
14 See Hohfeld, supra note 11, at 30 (describing the jural structure of rights and duties as jural 
correlatives). 
15 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 22-23 (2001); WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 123. 
16 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 84-91 (1975); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 1. 
17 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963) (en banc) 
(imposing strict liability on a manufacturer where it was in a better position to bear the costs of 
injuries than the people who were powerless to protect themselves). 
18 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1038-40 (2d ed. 2012). 
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permissibly impaired.19 Others contend that the concept in reality works 
(and ought to work) as a mechanism of efficient resource allocation, allowing 
courts to weed out obligations that might be inefficient when imposed on 
third parties.20 Still others point out that the concept of “touch and concern” 
could have been used to undo racially restrictive covenants and that it thus 
promotes the values of justice and equality.21 Importantly, the different 
normative constructions accept the jural meaning of the concept. Indeed, 
despite their disagreement, all these accounts take the jural meaning of the 
concept as a given. The competition among them is over the right set of 
values that should animate the concept and determine how it should be 
operationalized by courts.  
A third example is the concept of “good faith” in contract law. The 
common law of contracts has long been thought to impose an obligation of 
good faith on parties in the performance and enforcement of the contract.22 
While courts and scholars have maligned the concept for being too open-
ended and uncertain,23 this criticism ignores the reality that there remains a 
jural core to the concept that explains its persistence over time. Doctrinally, 
good faith connotes an obligation imposed on one contracting party, and 
inuring to the benefit of the other, to behave in an honest and commercially 
fair manner in its contractual dealings. On account of its open-endedness, 
the concept of good faith is capable of accommodating various normative 
 
19 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 883, 890-91 (1988) (presenting the two sides of the “touch and concern” debate); Richard A. 
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359-60 
(1982) (arguing that the “touch and concern” requirement denies the original parties their 
contractual freedom); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1177, 1233 (1982) (finding that the “touch and concern” test is beneficial as it safeguards individual 
freedom as well as promotes efficiency).  
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 925, 930 (proposing that courts will “find that a covenant touches and concerns land 
when the benefit or burden at issue is more efficiently allocated to the successors than to the 
original parties to the covenant”). 
21 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property Law and the Rise, Life, and Demise of Racially Restrictive 
Covenants 19 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 13-21, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2243028. 
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”); see 
also U.C.C. § 1-304 (2012) (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.” (alteration in original)). 
23 See, e.g., Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988) (calling 
the good faith requirement “a chameleon”); Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity 
Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 348 (2002) (analyzing seven factually 
similar cases with divergent outcomes to demonstrate “the futility of relying on a good faith standard 
absent a coherent framework for understanding the transaction”). 
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constructions. Hence, it is not surprising that, to some, good faith partakes 
of the idea of commercial morality and fairness, implicating the ideals of 
horizontal equality and fairness between the parties,24 while to others, it is 
used as a proxy for the law’s realization of its intrinsic efficiency goals 
relating to the regulation of contract making and enforcement.25 It is crucial 
to understand, though, that the disagreement revolves around the normative 
content of the concept, not its jural meaning. 
As we will show, other common law concepts, including the “reasonable 
person,” share the same design.26 All these concepts embody a core jural 
meaning that leaves sufficient elbow room for normative, value-driven/based 
constructions. It is precisely because of this reality that these concepts have 
endured the test of time and remain an integral part of the common law’s 
vocabulary and functioning to this day. For the same reason, common law 
concepts continue to inform and play a key role in statutory reforms.27  
While concepts in the common law have a relatively stable jural meaning 
embedded in them, their normative meaning certainly changes over time 
and context, allowing the common law as a whole to accommodate a plurality 
of normative values. It is precisely through the interaction between the two 
meanings that the common law itself changes. As is well known, substantive 
doctrinal change in the common law (i.e., the wholesale replacement of 
common law rules) is somewhat rare. The doctrinal content of the common 
law thus remains relatively static.28 The elements of “trespass,” “nuisance,” 
“repudiation,” “adverse possession,” and the like have remained largely the 
same for ages (and in some cases centuries) now. All the same, in its actual 
functioning, the common law has had no problem accommodating changing 
social preferences, values, and ideals. We argue that it is entirely because of 
its reliance on its conceptual architecture that the common law is able to 
 
24 See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualiza-
tion, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982) (arguing that “good faith” symbolizes a commitment to 
justice and contractual morality); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1225 (1999) (suggesting that the “good faith” requirement implicates 
“the role of the state in imposing minimal standards of honesty and fairness” in contractual dealings). 
25 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 
YALE L.J. 814, 852-53 (2006) (describing the use of precise terms in loan agreements, such as 
“promise to insure,” as proxies for good faith ex post). 
26 See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 
(2012) (arguing that reasonableness should be defined normatively, not positively or empirically). 
27 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (preventing corporate charters from 
limiting the liability of directors for, among other things, violations of the common law duties of 
loyalty and good faith).  
28 See Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 
256-65 (1980) (illustrating this reality using different doctrines in the areas of tort, contract, and 
property law). 
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achieve such normative change while leaving its doctrinal content largely 
intact. Change in the common law is thus in a sense chameleonic, insofar as it 
comes about with minimal structural disruption. As we argue, common law 
concepts contribute to this process of normative change in three possible ways.  
In the first method, which we characterize as the process of interpretive 
change, courts bring about change in the normative content of the common 
law by altering the relative importance of the jural and normative meanings 
of a legal concept. At any point in time, a legal concept embodies an 
equilibrium between its normative meaning and its commonly understood 
jural meaning. When a court seeks to change the normative meaning of a 
concept, it shifts the emphasis of the concept away from the more specific 
normative meaning and towards the more general jural meaning, which then 
allows it to imbue the concept with new or different normative content. A 
good example of such intraconceptual change is seen in the concept of 
“unreasonable interference,” which has long been a part of private nuisance.29 
In developing nuisance doctrine, courts initially used the idea merely to 
examine the objective nature of the defendant’s interference, that is, whether 
it was material.30 In due course, however, they began interpreting “unrea-
sonable interference” as requiring a balancing of the plaintiff ’s harm against 
the importance of the defendant’s activity. 31  Courts that achieved this 
change did so by emphasizing the concept’s jural meaning—of requiring a 
holistic balancing exercise—over its normative meaning, thereby altering 
the salience of the jural meaning in order to imbue it with new content. 
The second method of normative change is best described as interconceptual 
change. Here, the common law working through its substantive doctrines 
comes to emphasize one concept over others within a particular doctrine, 
thereby enabling it to affirm the normative values and ideas that are associated 
with that specific concept over others within the relevant doctrinal framework. 
And over time, the concept that the common law doctrine emphasizes 
evolves to determine the normative orientation of the doctrine as a whole. 
This phenomenon is seen in the doctrine of “adverse possession” in property 
law, which has long been known to consist of five conceptual elements: 
hostility, continuity, openness, actual possession, and exclusivity. 32  At 
 
29 Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 
409 (1974).  
30 See id. at 405 (“All [a plaintiff ] must show is that he has been injured by the defendant’s 
conduct . . . .”). 
31 See id. at 409 (describing how the courts began to evaluate reasonableness “by striking a 
balance between [the plaintiff ’s] suffering and the general standard of amenity”). 
32 See Dimmick v. Dimmick, 374 P.2d 824, 826 (Cal. 1962) (en banc) (analyzing the five concep-
tual elements); West v. Evans, 175 P.2d 219, 220 (Cal. 1946) (en banc) (same); Hacienda Ranch 
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different times, the law has emphasized one of these elements over the 
others, in effect altering the normative orientation of the doctrine. At one 
point, the common law emphasized the element of hostility, using it as a 
mechanism by which to scrutinize the motives of a party in an effort to 
emphasize fairness.33 Over time, adverse possession in many jurisdictions 
moved away from this concept and instead came to emphasize actual 
possession, which can be seen as an effort to imbue the doctrine with an 
emphasis on efficient resource use rather than subjective fairness.34 Thus, by 
increasing (or decreasing) the relative weight of hostility and actual 
possession in adverse possession, the common law oriented the doctrine 
towards (or away from) fairness at different times. Another good example of 
such salience alteration is to be found in the law of negligence, in the early 
battle between the concepts of “duty of care” and “proximate cause.”35 
Courts have used the terms in different contexts to modulate the scope of 
liability in the pursuit of different normative goals.36  
A third method of normative change in the common law that we describe 
here is the process of additive change, which involves the common law adding 
an altogether new concept into its repertoire, principally in order to introduce 
a new normative dimension (or objective) to an existing area of law. This 
method of change is fairly common. A familiar example is the inclusion of 
the “implied warranty of habitability,” which concretized the goal of 
 
Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 498, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (same); see also 
Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 667, 680 (1986) (“With adverse possession the requirements that possession be actual, open, 
notorious, continuous, hostile and under color of title are often read into statutes in order to flesh 
out their basic structure.”).  
33 See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 
336 (1983) (finding that in the majority of cases, judges have not hesitated to look into the 
possessor’s state of mind and subjective intent); see also Walls v. Grohman, 337 S.E.2d 556, 562 
(N.C. 1985) (overturning prior precedent that required a possessor to be a thief in order for the 
possession to be adverse); Epstein, supra note 32, at 687-89 (considering whether good faith 
possessors and bad faith possessors should be subject to different standards); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1039-40 
(2006) (describing how courts overwhelmingly favor good faith possessors).  
34 See Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Fennell, supra note 
33, at 1059-60 (arguing that the true purpose of adverse possession is to move land into the hands 
of a “higher-valuing user”).  
35 Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928) (finding that the injury 
was not foreseeable, and therefore the defendant had no duty), with id. at 103-05 (Andrews, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by the defendant); see also 
Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and 
the Rule of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (2001) (“The proximate cause issue . . . focuses on the 
purpose, not the application, of the relevant community norm.”). 
36 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 
950 (2010) (describing different suggested normative orientations for duty doctrine).  
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consumer (i.e., tenant) welfare into the law of leases, an area of substantive 
law that historically treated the parties’ interactions as an arm’s length 
transaction.37 It has since become a staple of the common law of landlord–
tenant relations. An additional example of this phenomenon is the concept 
of “quasi-property,” which the common law developed to connote a basis for 
liability that flowed from an obligation analogous to property’s right to 
exclude, but which would not attach to the physical boundaries of a  
resource.38 We see this concept emerging in the context of burial rights39 
and in the context of informational resources of fleeting economic value.40 
In addition to giving the common law an element of jural determinacy 
over time and normative determinacy on a contextual basis, legal concepts 
thus operationalize the common law’s basic mechanism of change: one that 
scholars have routinely characterized as “incrementalism”41 without explicating 
the nuance through which this actually comes about in practice. Examining 
the common law’s conceptual structure and the dual nature of meaning that 
these concepts embody reveals in somewhat granular detail precisely how 
common law incrementalism works in practice. 
Our analysis and defense of the common law’s basic conceptual architec-
ture in this Article yields three key contributions. Our first contribution is 
theoretical. By introducing the distinction between jural meaning and 
normative meaning, we bring into light the deep architecture of the common 
law that holds the key to the system’s vitality and longevity. It is through this 
unique combination that the common law has been able to provide legal 
actors with a solid foundation on which to build their legal expectations, 
 
37 See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding 
that there is an implied warranty of habitability in leases of urban dwelling units). See generally 
David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389 
(2011) (discussing the history and gradual weakening of the implied warranty of habitability 
doctrine). 
38 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1889, 1899-1900 (2012) [hereinafter Balganesh, Quasi-Property] (arguing that for quasi-
property interests, the entitlement derives from the nature, context, and consequence of the 
parties’ interactions). 
39 See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that relatives of the 
deceased have a quasi-property right to the body); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 
S.E. 24, 26 (Ga. 1905); O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899); Burney v. Children’s Hosp. 
in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897). 
40 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (“Regarding the 
news, . . . it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the 
public.”). 
41 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING 106 (2009); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 53 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996). 
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while leaving the door open to normative infusions of meaning, which 
produces a process of constant updating. As a result of the latter effect, 
common law doctrine has managed to remain relevant even in the face of 
radical changes in social preferences.  
Second, and relatedly, we show that the unique design of the common law 
system underwrites a constant competition in the marketplace for ideas. By 
keeping the normative meaning open to competing value-based interpretations, 
the common law metaphorically extends an open invitation to champions of 
particular philosophies and ideologies to reshape the normative meaning of 
common law concepts. In our vision, common law doctrines are never fully 
dominated by one value at any given time, as theorists like Judge Richard 
Posner and Professor Ernest Weinrib have suggested,42 but rather always 
embody a plurality of values even when it appears that a single value such as 
efficiency or fairness predominates. As a descriptive matter, it is therefore our 
view that the common law is impervious by its very structure to value monism. 
Third, we posit, as a normative matter, that it would be highly undesira-
ble—indeed, impractical—to endorse the calls of some legal theorists to 
engage in free-floating policy analysis that is not pegged to concrete legal 
concepts.43 In our view, legal concepts provide an essential framework for 
policy analysis and debate. General calls of the type to “maximize economic 
efficiency” or “do what is just” cannot on their own form a basis for the 
operation of a legal system. They are too abstract and general to serve a useful 
function. Legal concepts, by contrast, allow policymakers to take account of 
value-based theories that inform the law and apply them in a contextualized 
and nuanced fashion, such that they better fit our social preferences at any 
given time. 
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I begins with a discussion of the 
common law’s conceptual architecture. It unpacks the idea of legal “concepts” 
and differentiates it from other analogous (but distinct) terms such as princi-
ples and doctrines. It also discusses the two types of meaning that legal 
concepts in the common law can and do embody—jural and normative—and 
provides an overview of how the two operate symbiotically. Part II builds on 
the framework set out in Part I to argue that it is through the common law’s 
architecture of concepts that it is able to maintain an operational equilibrium 
between stability and change over time and across contexts. Part II explains 
the precise mechanism by which the common law’s normative goals can 
change over time, while the jural meaning remains static, and how this 
 
42 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 24; WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 19. 
43 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Judging Deception, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1779, 1789-90 (2007) (suggesting 
that cases with different factual elements be decided with a “more general theory”). 
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interaction contributes to the “growth,” “evolution,” and flexibility of the 
common law over time. Part III addresses the payoffs that flow from our 
account of the common law’s architecture, especially in the face of a barrage 
of criticism that has been leveled at the common law and legal concepts over 
the last several decades. A short conclusion ensues. 
I. LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE DUALITY OF MEANING 
Ever since the advent of Legal Realism as the dominant approach to 
common law analysis in the United States, legal concepts and conceptual 
analysis in the common law have come to be regarded with undue suspicion. 
Perhaps the most dramatic criticism of such conceptual analysis was seen in 
Felix Cohen’s account of the “heaven of legal concepts” that contained “all the 
logical instruments needed to manipulate and transform these legal concepts 
and thus to create and to solve the most beautiful of legal problems,” a process 
that was in the end of little value since it was “freed from all entangling 
alliances with human life.”44 The study of legal concepts and their role in legal 
reasoning was, to Cohen, mere “transcendental nonsense.”45 While conceptual 
analysis in the law has seen a resurgence in the years since, it has taken place 
largely within the domain of the philosophical analysis of the concept of law 
and only rarely ever beyond.46  Theorization about the common law, in 
particular, has tended to underemphasize the role of legal concepts.47 
A large part of the reason why conceptual analysis tends to be disfavored 
in the common law today is because it is commonly associated with a belief in 
the autonomy of law and legal reasoning. In other words, admitting a role for 
legal concepts is taken to be incompatible with a scrutiny of the common law’s 
underlying normative goals. This need not be the case.48 Legal concepts can 
coexist with a normative account of the common law. Indeed, they facilitate 
 
44 Cohen, supra note 2, at 809. Cohen’s rhetoric was powerful enough that Hart too thought 
it necessary to refer to it in his seminal book. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130 
(3d ed. 2012). 
45 Cohen, supra note 2, at 821. For a comprehensive rejoinder to Cohen, discussed in more 
detail below, see Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 16 (2000). 
46 See Charles Lowell Barzun, Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study, 
26 RATIO JURIS 215, 215-16 (2013). 
47 For exemplary work contrary to this trend, see Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra 
note 36; Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012); 
and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000). 
48 Judge Cardozo’s judicial decisions and writings can be seen as an effort to refute the idea 
that any reliance on legal concepts entails a belief in the autonomy of law (i.e., in mechanical 
jurisprudence). For an excellent account, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1419, 1455-74 (1999) (book review). 
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such an account because they are capable of accommodating and affirming 
multiple and different normative goals at different points in time. This Part 
provides an overview of what legal concepts are and how their duality of 
meaning renders them compatible with the normative analysis of the 
common law. 
A. Legal Concepts in the Common Law 
Since legal concepts are often used to define ideas in the law, it is somewhat 
artificial to attempt to define a legal concept. All the same, such a definition is 
of practical utility insofar as it enables us to understand legal concepts as 
distinct functional entities in the law. Legal concepts are ubiquitous in law 
and legal analysis, despite the influence of Legal Realism. They often serve 
to simplify complex social realities, thereby allowing the law to attach 
specific consequences to such realities. In the common law, legal concepts 
are thus best understood as the operational legal devices that the common law 
uses in doctrine to understand and compartmentalize aspects of a legal issue or 
dispute. This understanding of a legal concept embodies two important and 
perhaps related dimensions: (1) it must be operational and (2) it must be 
interpretive. Each of these deserves elucidation. 
In insisting that a legal concept embody an operational dimension, the 
understanding above limits legal concepts to those that are actively employed 
in legal doctrine and analyses, when applied to the facts of a particular case. It 
thereby excludes concepts that are purely academic or abstract and never 
directly employed as part of a court’s legal reasoning when deciding a case. An 
example of the latter would be the idea of “reciprocal” causation made famous 
by Ronald Coase.49 Very importantly, this operational dimension also helps 
distinguish between a legal concept and a legal doctrine. Legal doctrines in 
the common law usually depend on individual constituent elements, each of 
which in turn embodies one or more legal concepts that the doctrine uses to 
interact with the facts in question. On rare occasion, a doctrine may itself 
operate as a concept, in which case the operational dimension is satisfied. The 
doctrine of “unclean hands” in equity provides a good example.50 It relies on 
the concept of the exact same name for its working. Legal concepts, in our 
understanding, must therefore have a practical orientation and interact 
directly with facts in individual disputes. 
 
49 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). For a critique, see 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 
111 YALE L.J. 357, 391 (2001) (referring to Coase’s approach as one of “causal agnosticism”). 
50 See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. 
REV. 877 (1949). 
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It is for the same reason that legal concepts generally remain distinct 
from what Ronald Dworkin described as “principles.”51 Principles generally 
operate as background jural statements that merely provide a reason for a 
legal decisionmaker to decide one way or another, without necessitating a 
particular decision, as would be the case with a legal rule.52 In other words, a 
principle may be altogether disregarded by the decisionmaker, or come to be 
outweighed by a rule. As a general matter, then, principles are usually of 
indirect operational significance in doctrine, insofar as they are used to 
shape the application of doctrine without directly interacting with the facts 
of a case, rendering them distinct from legal concepts as defined here.53 
When, however, a legal principle comes to be directly embedded into a legal 
rule, such that it starts interacting directly with facts during the legal 
analysis, the principle becomes a legal concept in our understanding.54 
In addition, and perhaps somewhat more importantly, legal concepts are 
usually interpretive in nature. The idea of interpretive concepts was also 
made famous by Dworkin, who argued that the interpretive nature implies 
that these concepts have more than just a descriptive element to them.55 
They are instead understood by participants as serving some purpose or 
interest that has an existence quite independent of the concept itself. This 
interpretive nature also ensures that application of the concept to individual 
circumstances involves a distinct element of sensitivity to that purpose or 
value in question, such that the concept can be interpreted to be “modified 
or qualified” by the relevant purpose.56 Legal concepts therefore do more 
than just describe factual reality. The purposive and normative nature of 
legal reasoning imbues them with an evaluative dimension—wherein they 
(i.e., the concepts) are used to evaluate and understand reality, and at the 
same time are themselves influenced by criteria and values that are seen as 
 
51 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-26 (1977). 
52 A good example that Dworkin provides is the principle that “[n]o man may profit from his 
own wrong.” Id. at 26. 
53 For a useful rejoinder to Dworkin, suggesting that legal principles are not very distinct 
from legal rules in practice as understood by positivism, see Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the 
Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972). This debate is orthogonal to our analytical claims here and 
we therefore take no position on it. 
54 Dworkin recognizes this possibility himself. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 
supra note 51, at 28. The use of “reasonableness” in the Sherman Act is a good example, where 
unreasonableness at first played the role of a background principle in light of the terse wording of 
the statute but, in due course, came to play a more direct role once courts developed the “rule of 
reason” approach to antitrust analysis. As the name indicates, in the “rule of the reason,” the 
question of unreasonableness becomes part of the rule and is directly applied in the analysis. Here, 
we may legitimately say that it is a legal concept. See id. at 27-28. 
55 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-46 (1986). 
56 Id. at 47. 
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important to such reasoning. Or as Dworkin puts it, in such interpretive 
concepts “[v]alue and content have become entangled.”57 This point, as we 
shall see, is crucial to the role that such concepts play in facilitating normative 
change in the common law. 
Both of these conditions are characteristic of innumerable legal concepts 
in the common law. Even a cursory examination of common law doctrine 
will reveal that legal concepts, as captured in the definition above, dominate 
the actual content of the common law in a variety of areas. “Good faith,” 
“privity,” “duty of care,” “proximate cause,” “foreseeability,” “reasonableness,” 
“commercial fairness,” “unreasonable risk,” “offensive,” “substantial harm,” 
“wanton disregard,” “intentional,” and a host of others readily qualify.  
B. The Duality of Meaning 
Legal concepts are usually terms of ordinary linguistic usage. All the 
same, as a result of their use within legal reasoning, such terms can come to 
acquire an understanding that is different—in varying degrees—from their 
ordinary linguistic one. Yet this specialized (i.e., legal) understanding itself 
embodies two distinct dimensions. We describe these two dimensions as the 
“jural meaning” and the “normative meaning” of legal concepts.  
Scholars have previously noted the idea that legal concepts can have two 
meanings. Some legal theorists refer to it as the distinction between the 
“descriptive” and “prescriptive” meanings of legal terms, as the distinction 
between the “definition[al]” content of legal concepts and their “justificatory 
theory,” or as the difference between the legal concept as a mere “conceptual 
marker” and the foundational theory in the service of which it is employed 
in a particular context.58 What varies in these accounts is the precise source 
of each type of meaning, the contingent–permanent nature of the meaning, 
and the way in which the two meanings interact within legal reasoning. It is 
in these important respects—and not just terminological—that our account 
is distinct, since the common law’s conceptual architecture—as we argue—is 
intrinsically designed to accommodate the process of incremental normative 
change over time. 
 
57 Id. at 48. 
58 See generally Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1335 (1986); Timothy P. Terrell, “Property,” “Due Process,” and the Distinction Between Definition 
and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1981); Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—
Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541. We also see Zipursky implicitly adopting a 
similar distinction, though not explicitly. See Zipursky, supra note 47, 474-78.  
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1. Jural Meaning 
The jural meaning of a legal concept refers to its core structural under-
standing, which derives from both (1) the concept’s semantic content and (2) 
its use within the legal community (i.e., its pragmatic content). Our account 
of the jural meaning does not take the semantic (or plain) meaning of the 
concept to exhaust its entire jural domain. It also recognizes that the 
concept’s use within a certain community builds on the semantic content to 
give it a meaning that goes beyond its purely literal meaning—what is often 
referred to as the pragmatic content of the concept.59 The two (i.e., the 
semantic and pragmatic content of the concept) together give a concept its 
jural meaning. It begins with the semantic meaning of the concept but then 
situates that semantic meaning within the context of how the concept is 
actually used—jurally—within the relevant legal community.60 
Consider the concept of “proximate cause” in tort law.61 In its plain,  
linguistic sense, the concept simply denotes a close-enough antecedent event 
that can be causally attributed to a subsequent event.62 This constitutes the 
semantic content of the term and might seem almost entirely factual or 
descriptive. As used by the community of tort lawyers and courts, we see the 
semantic content coming to be refined such that the purely factual dimension 
is instead replaced with a distinctively evaluative one. When the semantic 
content is now understood together with the context of its usage (i.e., the 
pragmatic content), “proximate cause” now comes to mean the judgment that 
a certain antecedent event should be deemed by the law as close enough to be 
treated as legally responsible for the subsequent event based not just on fact 
but on independent evaluative criteria as well.63 This represents the jural 
meaning of the concept of proximate cause. Open-ended, abstract, and 
amenable to the exercise of judicial discretion as it may be, the jural meaning 
nonetheless gives the concept of proximate cause its basic structural content 
 
59 For an account of the semantic–pragmatic distinction, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: 
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 987 
(1996). 
60 See COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 7 (describing a similar process of using the inferential role 
of a concept to analyze a term as “inferential role semantics”). 
61 See generally Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633 
(1920); Charles E. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 
229 (1932); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924); James Angell 
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925). 
62 See Beale, supra note 61, at 633. 
63 See generally LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Richard W. 
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735 (1985). 
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as a legal concept that in turn enables it to be used as a part of the common 
vocabulary of tort law. 
Perhaps the best-known effort to discern the jural meaning of legal  
concepts along the lines just described is seen in the work of Wesley 
Hohfeld.64 Hohfeld is well known for having created an elaborate taxonomy 
of jural relations in the law in an effort to render legal usage clear.65 In so 
doing, however, Hohfeld’s approach was at once sensitive to both semantics 
and to usage within the legal community, both of which he sought to 
balance. While he of course did not seek to ground his analysis in a purely 
empirical investigation of how terms were actually used within the legal 
community, he at the same time allowed the jural content of the various 
concepts under analysis to be influenced by this reality. Describing his 
motivations and constraints in this regard, Hohfeld’s colleague Arthur 
Corbin characterized his approach as follows: 
Hohfeld effected this compromise at a convenient and serviceable point. He 
followed “inveterate usage” closely enough to be understood by the average 
lawyer. He accepted fundamental concepts “as used in judicial reason-
ing.” . . . All that was necessary was for him to see jural relations with their 
eyes, and to identify the several fundamental varieties of factual situations and 
to describe them in ordinary human words.66 
In thus trying to discern the jural meaning and content of different legal 
concepts as used in legal reasoning, Hohfeld’s approach was sensitive to 
both ordinary semantic meaning and the specialized usages within the 
relevant community. Very importantly, Hohfeld’s work was trans-
substantive and looked to a host of different substantive areas for support. 
Surely, as Hohfeld himself recognized, each of these areas remains wedded 
to different goals and purposes. Yet what allowed his project to retain its 
trans-substantive dimension was its recognition that the structural meaning 
of a concept could be discerned independent of an area’s commitment to 
specific goals. A “right” and a “duty” in this analysis meant something 
specific, and indeed the same thing, regardless of whether one was using the 
term in the context of contract law or constitutional law. It denoted an 
affirmative claim that an individual or entity had, which placed another 
 
64 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Hohfeld, supra note 11. 
65 See generally Albert Kocourek, The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal Concepts, 15 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 24 (1920). 
66 Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 235 (1921). 
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person or entity under an obligation of a certain kind. This is indeed what 
we mean by the jural meaning of a legal concept. 
Hohfeld’s analytical work, its trans-substantive dimension, and its  
endurance for a full century highlight a fairly important reality for our 
analysis; namely, that almost all legal concepts in the common law do indeed 
contain a discernible structural logic that undergirds their ability to remain 
a part of the common vocabulary within the broader legal community. This 
structural component may originate in the pure semantics of the concept, in 
its structural relationship to other concepts within a given domain, and in the 
way in which the relevant interpretive community comes to understand it. 
An important caveat is in order here. Merely because the jural meaning 
of a concept—as we describe it—can derive some of its content from the 
way in which the concept is used by the relevant legal actors, we should not 
be taken to suggest that such use alone, when taken from an external point 
of view, can on its own constitute the concept’s jural meaning.67 In other 
words, the allowance for usage to play a role in determining the jural 
meaning does not imply that jural meaning now becomes a purely, or even 
principally, empirical inquiry. While the inquiry may indeed look to what 
the relevant legal actors see as the relevant legal concept, the inquiry is an 
attempt to understand the meaning of the concept through their eyes (i.e., 
from a principally internal point of view). It therefore is not an effort to 
understand how they modify their behavior in light of such concepts, or an 
effort to predict the consequences that flow from the use of a legal concept. 
To adopt the latter approach would in effect be to deny legal concepts their 
own internal meaning, in the suggestion that such concepts are metaphysical 
placeholders that are “meaningless” in their own right, an idea famously 
advanced by the Scandinavian Realists.68  
In looking to the relevant interpretive community to understand the jural 
meaning of a concept, the examination is therefore of that community’s 
understanding of the concept’s structural prerequisites. And to achieve this, 
one must look to the semantic and linguistic content of the legal concept in 
order to appreciate how the community’s understanding builds on, and 
interfaces with, that understanding. Indeed, this is precisely what we 
understand Hohfeld to have been attempting to do as well, in looking into 
how courts and judges understood and applied the various jural relations 
that he identified. The precise balance between semantic content and actual 
usage will of course vary from one context to another, but the task of 
 
67 For a similar point, see H. L. A. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 1959 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 237-38.  
68 Id. at 235. 
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discerning a concept’s jural meaning must not lose sight of the fact that both 
remain equally relevant to the exercise.  
Consider the example of “originality” in the federal common law of  
copyright.69 As understood by copyright lawyers and courts today, and in 
the wake of recent jurisprudence in the United States, originality is equated 
with “creativity” and understood to require that a work of authorship 
exhibit a modicum of creativity for it to qualify for copyright protection.70 
If one were to simply look to what judges say about originality in cases, one 
might be tempted to treat originality and creativity as synonyms, and 
nothing more. Yet this would miss an important jural reality behind the 
meaning of originality; namely, that it is not sufficient if the work in 
question is objectively creative, but that such creativity must originate (i.e., 
have its origins) in the creator seeking protection.71 Courts rarely ever 
address this question given how basic it is; and most take it as embedded 
within the semantic meaning of originality as requiring the origination of 
the creative content by the claimant. It is only when one recognizes that 
there is indeed an internal logic to such concepts and that usage can help 
glean that logic rather than replace it altogether, that looking to usage can 
be helpful. In the example of originality, the usage by the community builds 
on the semantic content and adds the objective requirement of creative 
evaluation onto the semantic one of origination. Both work together to 
produce the jural meaning. 
Most concepts in the common law thus have a jural meaning that is  
discernible through the semantic meaning of the concept and its common 
usage within the interpretive community, when viewed from an internal 
point of view. In addition, since it is oftentimes impossible to distinguish 
between decision rules and conduct rules in the common law,72 many of the 
common law’s legal concepts also embody a distinctive evaluative dimension 
and come to partake of what Bernard Williams famously described as “thick 
concepts.”73 Thick concepts, as philosophers have since come to understand 
the term, refer to evaluative concepts where the evaluative content comes 
 
69 See generally Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1992) (highlighting the serious repercussions attached to copyright law’s 
definition of originality). 
70 See id. at 14. 
71 Id. at 14-15 (describing this as the “independent effort” or “independently originated” 
standards). 
72 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (describing conduct rules as rules designed to guide 
behavior and decision rules as rules directed to officials applying the law). 
73 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140-44 (1985). 
  
1260 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1241 
 
with an identifiable descriptive content that influences and directs such 
evaluation.74 A common example is the distinction between the concepts of 
“good” and “beautiful.” Both involve an evaluation; yet the former (good) is 
open-ended and specifies no descriptive criteria for the evaluation, whereas 
the latter (beautiful) conveys additional descriptive content—that of 
requiring the evaluation to focus on aesthetically pleasing dimensions—in 
carrying out the evaluation. Thick concepts contain implicit semantic 
direction to the evaluator about the appropriate criteria that may be used 
whereas thin concepts leave this open-ended. Once again, we see how the 
semantic content of the concept itself contributes to the jural meaning of the 
concept. As a normative enterprise, the law contains innumerable thick 
concepts. Examples are legion: “good faith,” “reasonableness,” “best interests,” 
“business judgment,” “fair use,” etc. The precise descriptive content is of 
course different for each of these concepts, which is why thickness is  
understood as a continuum rather than as a binary.75 All the same, these 
concepts require actors to carry out their evaluations using different criteria. 
One may of course complain that such criteria are too open-ended, or that 
they give judges too much discretion and so on, but one cannot accuse the 
concepts of lacking meaning and analytical content. 
It is this underlying structural logic to legal concepts—which we term as 
the concept’s jural meaning—that contributes to what Jeremy Waldron has 
previously described as the “systematicity” of the law.76 In his rejoinder to 
Felix Cohen, Waldron argues that legal concepts play a crucial role in 
enabling the legal system and decisionmakers therein to see its various rules 
as necessarily interrelated. As he puts it: 
[T]he technical language of the law . . . must be able to express the actual 
interrelationships of legal provisions, laid down by diverse and competing 
lawmakers. The conceptual terminology of legal doctrine must be able to  
accommodate policy initiatives inspired by different moralities, ideologies, and 
programs, while resisting theoretical identification with any one of them. It 
must be understood as a sort of neutral matrix on which their interlocking 
 
74 See generally Simon Kirchin, Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts (providing an example 
using the terms “good” and “honest” to describe the different degrees of thickness), in THICK 
CONCEPTS 1 (Simon Kirchin ed., 2013). 
75 See Samuel Scheffler, Morality Through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy, 96 PHIL. REV. 411, 417-19 (1987) (book review) (reasoning that because our 
“ethical vocabulary is very rich and diverse,” simply designating terms as thick or thin is an 
oversimplification). 
76 Waldron, supra note 45, at 19 & n.14.  
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relations can be laid out without any assumption that the various elements 
were, so to speak, made for one another.77 
It is the jural meaning of the concept that in our view contributes to this 
ideal of systematicity, by forming the elements that go into the construction 
of the “neutral matrix” of interlocking ideals and propositions in the law. 
In short, the jural meaning of a legal concept refers to the structural core 
that gives the concept its logical basis as a term of usage. It originates in the 
semantic content of the concept, which may include both structural and 
descriptive criteria that are relevant and often interfaces with usage within 
the community that sharpens or modifies the semantic content in question. 
2. Normative Meaning 
While the jural meaning of legal concepts gives them a common structural 
understanding within the relevant interpretive community and contributes to 
the overall systematicity of the legal system, the jural meaning on its own is 
oftentimes insufficient to apply the concept to individual scenarios and arrive 
at distinct conclusions. For instance, knowing the jural meaning of “proximate 
cause” as a device for evaluating the causal connection between two events for 
the purposes of legal responsibility does not on its own tell a court whether 
a particular defendant’s actions should—in a particular case—be treated as 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries, for example, whether the 
railroad company’s actions should be treated as a proximate cause of Mrs. 
Palsgraf ’s injuries.78  
Legal concepts, despite being endowed with jural meaning, exhibit a 
characteristic that has been variously described as the phenomenon of “open 
texture,”79 “pervasive vagueness,”80 or “furry edges.”81 Applying them to any 
particular context requires the decisionmaker or interpreter to rely on 
additional factors beyond the domain of the standard jural meaning, since 
the jural content of the concept has in effect run out.82 This reliance on 
 
77 Id. at 47.  
78 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 352 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) 
(“What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a 
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. 
This is not logic. It is practical politics.”). 
79 See Hart, supra note 44, at 124. 
80 Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1124 (2008). 
81 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 51, at 22 (using the term “furry 
edges” to describe Hart’s theory). 
82 See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 18 (1993) (describing 
the “need for judges in some cases to make ‘a fresh choice between open alternatives’”); Schauer, 
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additional factors is discretionary on the part of the interpreter but is of 
course to a large extent constrained by the jural meaning of the concept 
itself. Yet it works in tandem with the jural meaning to now generate 
meaning for the term that allows it to be applied to a given context. The 
choice of additional factors is an indelibly normative one, and the meaning 
that is so produced constitutes the normative meaning of the concept. In 
our example before, if the decisionmaker were to decide that the question of 
whether to find a cause to be close enough for legal responsibility ought to 
track his or her understanding of morality (in ascribing responsibility), the 
jural understanding of proximate cause now combines with this additional, 
non-structural (i.e., moral) understanding to generate the normative 
meaning of the concept: as representing sufficient closeness between the 
events such that it is morally acceptable to consider one as the cause of the 
other for the purposes of legal responsibility.83 
The normative meaning of a legal concept thus involves the superimpo-
sition of a normative consideration on the jural meaning of the concept 
when applying it to a particular context or dispute. A few things therefore 
flow from this. First, the normative meaning of a legal concept is oftentimes 
a highly contested issue among courts, scholars, and lawyers. Since the 
additional variable chosen is not dictated by the concept itself, actors 
invariably tend to choose different normative values based on their own 
preferences. This contestation, however, is also the site and basis of legal 
change in the common law, as we show in Part II below. Second, the jural 
meaning of the concept is itself constitutive of the normative meaning, such 
that the normative meaning has no existence independent of the former. 
Part of what the normative meaning of a legal concept is depends on its 
taking the jural meaning and infusing it with non-structural normative 
considerations. Understanding this overlay is important because disagreement 
over the normative meaning tends to be couched as disagreement over the 
very jural meaning of the legal concept. Relatedly, such disagreement over 
normative meaning is also used by some to suggest that the concept is 
altogether meaningless, since there remains no common understanding 
about the concept itself.84 It is only when the superimposition of the two is 
appreciated that such claims can be seen to be exaggerated.  
 
supra note 80, at 1125 (explaining how, with vague laws and multiple applications, judges are 
required to sometimes exercise discretion and apply extralegal factors to reach a decision). 
83 See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 505-06 
(1992) (linking proximate cause to outcome responsibility). 
84 Cf. Hart, supra note 67, at 235. 
  
2015] Structure and Value in the Common Law 1263 
 
As Dworkin noted, actors engaged in legal reasoning invariably approach 
concepts with an interpretive attitude—characterized by the recognition of a 
purpose underlying a concept and the ability of that purpose to qualify or 
modify the meaning of that concept.85 It is indeed this interpretive attitude 
that generates the normative meaning of legal concepts. As a result of the 
recognition that concepts in the law serve important purposes—defined by 
distinctively normative considerations—the very process of interpreting a 
concept involves infusing it with those pre-identified purposes, a process that 
while generally couched in positive language (e.g., concept x means y) in 
reality involves a normative judgment (i.e., concept x should mean y). The 
process of elucidating the normative meaning of a concept is therefore a 
distinctively “justificatory” exercise, even if it is framed as a purely “explana-
tory” one.86  
In characterizing this second meaning of legal concepts as “normative,” we 
should not be understood as claiming that the jural meaning of the concept is 
in some ways purely descriptive, or as embodying a truth-value that renders it 
altogether value neutral.87 We thus are in no way attempting to resurrect the 
analytic–synthetic and fact–value distinctions that philosophers have famously 
come to reject.88 Indeed, some have criticized efforts to derive separate 
meanings for legal concepts as requiring just such a distinction and, in 
addition, a purely positivist approach to law, that is, the belief that legal rules 
and ideas are altogether immune from morality and other similar considera-
tions.89 Our claim here is quite different.  
The distinction between the jural and normative meanings that we draw 
here would work perfectly well as long as one takes the difference between 
structural and substantive concerns underlying the concept to be our central 
concern. Whereas the jural meaning is a reference to structural concerns, 
the normative meaning relates to substantive concerns. It is very well 
 
85 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 47 (describing how the interpretive 
attitude has two components, the first being an assumption about value, and the second that the 
rules and concepts are “sensitive to [the] point”). 
86 See COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 9. 
87 But see Westen, supra note 58, at 544 (arguing that some concepts, such as “federal,” are 
descriptive and neutral). 
88 For accounts of these distinctions, see HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2004); Ruth Anna Putnam, Creating Facts 
and Values, 60 PHIL. 187 (1985); W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951); 
Richard Swinburne, Analytic/Synthetic, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 31 (1984); Friedrich Waismann, Analytic–
Synthetic, 10 ANALYSIS 25 (1949). 
89 See, e.g., Barzun, supra note 46, at 216 (explaining and critiquing how some theorists argue 
legal rights can be derived from purely conceptual claims and do not require any normative 
arguments). 
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possible that these structural concerns themselves derive from predispositions 
as to certain values within the relevant legal community. Going back to the 
example of proximate cause in tort law, it might well be argued (as some have) 
that the very idea underlying the proximate cause concept and requirement 
exhibits a judgment that there is an outer bound to the causal chain that the 
law will recognize in order to impose liability. Even so, this judgment call is 
very different from the additional judgment call of whether, accepting the 
need for such an outer bound, we then ought to draw that boundary based on 
considerations of morality, as opposed to, say, pure efficiency. It is this 
intuition that our distinction between the jural and normative meanings of 
legal concepts hopes to capture. 
The distinction above is perhaps best captured in the distinction  
between epistemic values and moral values that Brian Leiter has made, in 
defense of what he calls “descriptive jurisprudence.”90 The epistemic value 
refers to “truth-conducive desiderata we aspire to in theory construction,” 
whereas the moral value relates directly to “practical reasonableness.”91 The 
former focuses on the significance and importance of the phenomenon in 
question being captured by the concept, while the latter directly engages the 
“ought” question.92  
This distinction leads us to another important insight about the normative 
meaning of a legal concept. Since it derives from the open-textured nature of 
the concept, and such open texture becomes obvious primarily when the 
concept is sought to be applied to a given situation, the normative meaning of 
a concept is generally formulated during the concept’s direct application to a 
scenario. It is therefore rare to see the concept of proximate cause being 
understood in moral and ethical terms while in the abstract; though it is 
routinely associated with values of morality or efficiency when applied to 
individual cases or circumstances. The normative meaning of a concept is 
thus principally application-driven. Constitutional law scholars have captured 
a largely analogous idea in the distinction between the “interpretation” and 
“construction” of texts or rules.93  The former focuses on linguistic and 
semantic meaning, while the latter is concerned principally with the legal 
 
90 Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 
AM. J. JURIS. 17, 30-43 (2003). 
91 Id. at 34-35. 
92 See id. at 35 (“Moral values are those values that bear on the questions of practical reasona-
bleness, e.g., questions about how one ought to live . . . .”). 
93 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
95, 100-08 (2010) (highlighting the distinction between construction and interpretation and arguing 
that it is important for legal scholars to understand this “real and fundamental” distinction). 
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effect of the text when applied, which is an entirely normative exercise and 
looks to considerations external to the text itself.94 
An important caveat is in order here. In characterizing the “normative” 
factors that go into generating a legal concept’s normative meaning from its 
jural meaning, we remain indifferent to the question of whether these factors 
constitute “legal” or “extra-legal” factors. In Hart’s positivist account, these 
factors, which he saw as central to the exercise of judicial discretion, were 
extra-legal, in transcending the traditional domains of legal reasoning.95 To 
Dworkin on the other hand, these normative considerations were emblematic 
of “principles” that courts use as part of legal rules thereby rendering them 
legitimate sources of law.96 Our account here remains perfectly compatible 
with either view, since nothing in our identification of a concept’s normative 
meaning turns on its characterization as legal or extra-legal. 
In summary then, the normative meaning of a legal concept refers to the 
meaning that the structural idea behind the concept comes to acquire when 
sought to be applied to individual scenarios, necessitating a decisionmaker’s 
reliance on values and considerations external to the concept itself. In so 
doing, the decisionmaker is making a direct normative judgment about what 
values ought to be driving that concept, when applying it as part of common 
law doctrine. 
*      *      * 
The duality of meaning that we defend here might be contrasted with 
accounts which argue that legal concepts contain a single meaning at any 
given point in time. In recent work, Jody Kraus offers a single meaning 
account of concepts in the common law and suggests that this single 
meaning can undergo a radical transformation over time, in order to 
accommodate competing normative values.97 An account of legal concepts 
that is wedded to the idea of a singularity—as opposed to duality—in their 
meaning, is then compelled to identify “the” meaning of a concept, as used 
and applied by courts across a substantive area.98 Failing this identification, 
a singularity-based account risks the argument that the inability to identify 
 
94 Id. at 96. 
95 See HART, supra note 44, at 127; see also BIX, supra note 82, at 25-28; DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 51, at 17. 
96 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 51, at 28-39. 
97 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical 
Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 303, 326 (2007) (describing this 
process as “radical semantic evolution”). 
98 Id. at 331-36. 
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a consistently accepted meaning suggests that a concept is in the end 
altogether meaningless. The “duality of meaning” account, by contrast, 
provides a coherent explanation for the seeming “inconsistencies” in courts’ 
usage of the term. 
II. STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW 
In Part I, we examined how concepts work in the common law and the 
difference between the jural and normative meanings that legal concepts 
embody. In this Part, we proceed to show how the interaction between the 
two is responsible for maintaining an adequate level of stability necessary 
for the successful operation of the common law, while at the same time 
allowing for change at the normative level.  
A. The Static–Dynamic Equilibrium in the Common Law 
One of the core functions of the law is to guide behavior.99 For this reason, 
the law must remain relatively stable, so that law-abiding citizens can plan 
their actions in accordance with the law and develop reasonable expectations 
about the legitimacy of their decisions.100 This logic is central to the idea of 
the rule of law and is often captured by the simplistic observation that “the 
rule of law lies in a law of rules.”101 An ever-changing legal system would 
impose an impossible cost on its subjects, forcing them to constantly  
re-educate themselves about the content of the law or live in fear of breaking 
it. And if laws were routinely broken and violated, even without actual 
enforcement, the overall legitimacy and credibility of the legal system would 
as a direct result come to be undermined.102 Therefore, lawmakers cannot 
change the law haphazardly. 
 At the same time, no one seriously argues that the legal system should 
remain frozen in time—especially insofar as the system’s values and ideals 
go. The law must reflect the normative values of the people who enacted it 
and as they change over time; the law must adapt to ensure a good fit 
between its normative underpinnings and the content of its rules. In fact, 
 
99 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 218 
(2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he law should be capable of providing effective guidance.”). 
100 Id. at 214-15 (“Stability is essential if people are to be guided by law in their long-term 
decisions.”). 
101 The idea was coined by Justice Antonin Scalia, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989), and is often associated with him, see HANOCH 
DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW 
THEORY 203 (2013). 
102 See DAGAN, supra note 101, at 203. 
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when the law falls behind the times, it fails to serve the society that adopted 
it, thereby undermining its own legitimacy. 
 Striking the right balance between the demands of stability and change is 
therefore a challenge that every legal system must overcome. Jurists have long 
identified this challenge and have argued that the best way to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of stability and change is through a mechanism of 
incremental or accretive evolution, often characterized as “incrementalism”103 
or “minimalism.”104 In their descriptive accounts of the common law, Atiyah,105 
Cardozo106 and Holmes107 masterfully explain how common law doctrine has 
evolved over centuries through incremental doctrinal changes. By avoiding 
abrupt and sweeping reform (unless absolutely crucial), common law judges 
were able to secure continuity in the law without unduly disrupting actors’ 
expectations. This task was facilitated by their reliance on the “declaratory 
theory” of the common law, according to which incremental ( judicial) changes 
in the common law were seen as merely restating the “correct” version of the 
common law that had always been so, rather than as actively altering the law to 
create altogether new rules.108 While almost everyone understood that judges 
were in effect creating new rules, the declaratory theory provided the process 
of incremental change with a rhetorical alibi that legitimized the process. At 
the heart of this theory lies the idea that the law comes to be modified through 
a process of small and gradual changes. 
 More recently, Professor Cass Sunstein has elevated incrementalism (or 
“minimalism,” as he calls it) to the level of a normative theory, advocating that 
all important legal changes, not only those of traditional common law areas, 
should be effected gradually.109 In addition to unfairly disrupting expectations, 
Sunstein argues that minimalism, which he associates with the political 
theorist Edmund Burke, is premised on the idea that “established traditions are 
generally just, adaptive to social needs, or at least acceptable.”110 Burke who 
 
103 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 21, 58 (2007) (noting how the incrementalism of the common law appears to contribute to 
“legal predictability”). 
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006) (“Burkean 
minimalists believe that constitutional principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, with 
close reference to long-standing practices.”). 
105 See generally P.S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW (1987). 
106  See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); 
CARDOZO, supra note 9.  
107 See generally HOLMES, supra note 9; Holmes, supra note 10. 
108 For an excellent recent account of the declaratory theory, see Allan Beever, The Declaratory 
Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2013). 
109 SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 5. 
110 Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 104, at 353. 
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considered the common law “the pride of the human intellect,”111 lauded the 
common law for closely tracking actual practices. 
 While these accounts of incrementalism in the common law are both  
accurate and persuasive, they miss an important insight about incrementalism 
itself. In focusing on the gradual nature of the change at the doctrinal level, 
these accounts of incrementalism ignore the intrinsically adaptive role that 
the actual content of the static doctrine plays, which in turn enables  
common law doctrine to remain by and large unchanging while, at the same 
time, responsive to shifting social values and preferences. In other words, 
although common law doctrine may itself change infrequently and only over 
extended periods of time, it is able to nonetheless remain relevant as a social 
institution because its underlying devices (i.e., its legal concepts) are 
capable of accommodating and advancing the “felt necessities of the 
time.” 112  The common law’s conceptual framework thus forms the very 
backbone of its commitment to incrementalism as a process of growth. Yet 
extant accounts of common law incrementalism tend to ignore this reality, 
which contributes to the characterization of the common law as an institution 
that is traditional, conservative, and archaic in multiple respects, which is 
indeed far from being true in practice. It is this omission in discussions of 
incrementalism that our account addresses. Our claim is that the common 
law’s ability to adapt to changes without unduly disrupting actors’ expectations 
is embedded in the unique design and role of common law concepts. 
As an example, consider a recent account of common law incrementalism 
offered by Justice Breyer of the U.S. Supreme Court in a dissenting opinion 
involving the overruling of a common law precedent.113 In describing the 
process, he notes that “[c]ommon-law courts rarely overruled well-
established earlier rules outright. Rather, they would over time issue 
decisions that gradually eroded the scope and effect of the rule in question, 
which might eventually lead the courts to put the rule to rest.”114 Clearly 
unhappy with the majority opinion in the case, he goes on to note that 
“[t]he reader should compare today’s ‘common-law’ decision with Justice 
Cardozo’s decision in Allegheny College . . . and note a gradualism that does 
not characterize today’s decision.”115 These observations about the common 
law’s process of gradual change emphasize the restraint that common law 
 
111 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND 
BURKE 416, 456 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). 
112 HOLMES, supra note 9, at 1. 
113 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 928 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  
114 Id. 
115 Id. (citation omitted). 
  
2015] Structure and Value in the Common Law 1269 
 
courts are believed to exhibit, even when they see pre-existing law as worthy 
of being changed. What this account altogether ignores, though, is the all-
important role that legal concepts played in enabling this—especially in the 
very decision that Justice Breyer extolls as the archetype of common law 
incrementalism! 
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank116 has long been  
understood as a case involving the doctrine of promissory estoppel and its 
relationship to the requirement of consideration in contract law.117 In the short 
opinion, then-Chief Judge Cardozo is taken to have successfully allowed a 
claim of promissory estoppel by the plaintiff notwithstanding the existing 
understanding of consideration.118 While the opinion may be a perfect example 
of common law incrementalism, Cardozo succeeds in adopting an incremental 
strategy by working closely with the legal concept of consideration. As one 
scholar aptly puts it, in Cardozo’s hands, consideration “is a more open and 
flexible concept than is usually appreciated.”119 The opinion showcases the role 
that legal concepts play in underwriting the process of incremental doctrinal 
change, with some even using it to characterize Cardozo as a “pragmatic 
conceptualist.”120 In the opinion itself, Cardozo offers an interesting account of 
legal concepts in the common law,121 which scholars have in the years since 
spent significant time interpreting. He thus notes:  
Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so many 
considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the 
symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much from 
any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice 
and procedure. The concept survives as one of the distinctive features of 
our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on the 
way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts, however, the pres-
sure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.122 
In this somewhat obscure language, Cardozo is in effect extolling the 
malleability of legal concepts in the common law—which enables them to 
 
116 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
117 See Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and Formalism 
in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149, 150 (2005). 
118 See id. 
119 Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny College 
Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 670 (1987). 
120 Bridgeman, supra note 117, at 183 n.170. The original characterization of Cardozo’s juris-
prudence as a whole derives from Goldberg, The Life of the Law, supra note 48, at 1462 (“Cardozo 
was a ‘pragmatic conceptualist.’”). 
121 See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 175 (N.Y. 1927). 
122 Id. at 175 (citation omitted). 
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take new meaning and content—while remaining “distinctive” within the 
doctrinal apparatus of the law.123 The incrementalism of the common law 
then, even to Cardozo, was a direct result of the law’s conceptual structure 
that in turn allowed for the common law as a whole to balance stability and 
change. To Cardozo, common law concepts were forged and refined by the 
contextual needs of individual cases (i.e., what we refer to as “values”), and 
yet—perhaps most importantly—they were not to be treated as altogether 
dispensable elements of the law.124 
As noted previously, common law concepts have a core jural meaning that 
remains constant through time and a normative meaning that is adaptable.125 
It is through the interaction between these two meanings, both embodied in 
legal concepts that the common law’s process of incremental change is 
enabled. The jural meaning of legal concepts gives the common law its 
requisite stability. Whenever the common law is used by courts and litigants, it 
invariably relies on doctrines to resolve individual disputes. These doctrines, in 
turn, employ legal concepts. Consequently, when actors go about their daily 
affairs, they rely on those concepts as guideposts. For example, professionals 
know that they must act reasonably. Similarly, in a contractual setting, parties 
understand that they must negotiate in good faith. The same is true when a 
dispute arises. In the standard common law case, the litigants agree on the 
particular doctrine that applies to their dispute and the key concepts that 
inform it. What they tend to disagree about, then, is the question of how that 
doctrine applies to the agreed upon facts and circumstances of the case, or 
how to construe the relevant concepts. 
The jural meaning of concepts, in our account, stabilizes the common 
law edifice, providing an important focal point for actors, judges, and even 
scholars. The jural meaning can be thought of as the anchor of the common 
law, the component that operationalizes stare decisis.126 Without this anchor, 
courts would be unable to find common ground in prior decisions in order 
to treat them as binding and applicable. It is thus concepts, by virtue of 
their jural meaning, that provide a common denominator that ensures 
continuity in the common law. 
 
123 See Konefsky, supra note 119, at 647. 
124 For an excellent account of Cardozo’s approach to legal analysis and his extensive reliance 
on legal concepts, see Goldberg, The Life of the Law, supra note 48, at 1452 (arguing that, to 
Cardozo, the job of the judge “was to understand, articulate, and apply—rather than to decon-
struct or hide behind—the concepts embedded in law.”). 
125 See supra Part I. 
126 See William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1949) (“Stare 
decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence. 
Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to a society.”). 
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Take, for example, the concept of “good faith” in the common law of 
contracts. 127  Under the common law of most jurisdictions, contracting 
parties are under an obligation to negotiate and perform contracts in good 
faith. This rule is taken to be a fairly well-established and immutable one 
that has persisted for at least two centuries now.128 And yet the law speaks 
of the content of this obligation in largely open-ended terms. The Uniform 
Commercial Code, for instance, which largely codifies the common law 
standard,129 defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”130 While the particular list 
of behaviors that violate the obligation of good faith have no doubt changed 
over time and with context—for example, the obligation in relation to banks 
is different from that in relation to merchants—the core jural meaning of 
the concept has remained the same.131 Courts, judges, legislatures, and 
practitioners all have a shared understanding or common knowledge of the 
concept and the obligation that it connotes as a structural matter, even if 
not in its application to an individual case.  
The idea described here is also captured in the distinction that some legal 
philosophers make between the notions of indeterminacy and contestability in 
the language of the law.132 While legal indeterminacy can originate in a 
variety of reasons, in many situations legal terms (i.e., concepts) are often 
“contestable” rather than ambiguous or vague. In these situations, as Jeremy 
Waldron explains, it is not that the terms in question lack meaning or that the 
determinacy of their meaning is compromised.133 Instead, as he clarifies, “it is 
part of the meaning of these words to indicate that a value judgment is 
required, a function which the words perform quite precisely.” 134  This  
captures rather well our point about the jural meaning of legal concepts. 
The jural meaning grounds legal actors’ common understanding of a 
concept; and yet the concept preserves significant room for the actor’s own 
 
127 For a good overview of good faith in contract law, see Summers, supra note 24; Robert S. 
Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). 
128 For an overview of the origins of good faith, see Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good 
Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689, 690-94 (2013).  
129 See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) (“[I]n 
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
130 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2012). 
131 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-4, at 11 
(6th ed. 2010). 
132 See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. 
L. REV. 509, 512-14 (1994) (distinguishing between “vague,” “ambiguous,” and “contestable” 
expressions). 
133 See id. at 527. 
134 Id. 
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value judgment, embodied in the normative meaning that the concept 
carries. From the fact that the normative meaning of a concept can change 
over time and context, and that it can generate disagreement among actors, 
one cannot (indeed, should not) draw the inference that the concept lacks all 
meaning. Indeed, Waldron makes the point somewhat sharper when he 
further notes that in eliciting some kind of value judgment from actors, 
such concepts embody a “clear meaning.”135  
The open nature of legal concepts therefore does not imply that such 
 concepts lack meaning, or indeed that such meaning can originate in and 
perhaps define a shared understanding among actors. The reason for this is 
rather straightforward: it is because linguistic vagueness, which derives from 
natural language, need not correspond to jural certainty or uncertainty in legal 
usage.136 In other words, a term that is otherwise palpably unclear (or even 
meaningless) can obtain jural content within a particular discourse (such as 
legal discourse), if actors converge around a common understanding over 
time. Indeed, this is the entire idea behind so-called “terms of art” or “legal 
fictions.” It informs how the jural meaning of concepts ensures a modicum of 
stability and operates as an anchor. 
Another way of understanding the working of a concept’s jural meaning is 
therefore as a form of shared understanding among actors. Recall that a vast 
majority of legal concepts are evaluative, in the sense that they require actors 
to make value judgments when applying the concept to specific contexts and 
disputes.137 In so requiring actors to make value judgments, the jural meaning 
of the concept does not, however, give its interpreter complete carte blanche. 
Instead, it grounds and directs that value judgment in a particular direction. It 
takes certain kinds of normative considerations off the table and renders certain 
other ones more relevant and salient to the judgment itself. We noted previ-
ously that this is precisely how “thick” concepts work. Drawing on the 
linguistic philosopher R.M. Hare, Waldron characterizes this idea as the strict 
or specific “evaluative meaning” that the concept carries.138 Each legal concept, 
in other words, despite its normative open-endedness when applied to specific 
situations, signals to judges and actors that the disagreement (if any) in 
application is to be limited to certain specific criteria. The identification of 
such criteria enables the jural meaning of the legal concept to feed into a 
community’s shared understandings and linguistic conventions, despite the 
 
135 Id. 
136 See id. at 537 (“[W]e must not make the mistake of assuming that the vagueness of natural 
language predicates matches our pragmatic uncertainty about what should be done in future or 
unanticipated cases.”). 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
138 Waldron, supra note 132, at 528-29. 
  
2015] Structure and Value in the Common Law 1273 
 
overall ethical and evaluative nature of the legal concept. A concept’s thickness, 
in other words, contributes directly to the stability of the concept’s meaning, 
even in the face of differential application. 
Indeed, a careful perusal of common law cases reveals that judges have a 
shared understanding of the jural meaning of the common law concepts. The 
core jural meaning of the concept of good faith in contracts is understood or 
defined in the same way by all judges. It requires judges to evaluate the 
contracting parties’ behavior and motives contextually, using certain normative 
criteria. The normative criteria can vary, but the central evaluative obligation 
that the concept requires does not. Additionally, the evaluative dimension is 
hardly unspecified. The legal concept also indicates the general character that 
the evaluation is to take. For example, it excludes aesthetic judgments, 
character assessments, political considerations, and criteria relating to legal 
status. Furthermore, good faith in contract law is understood to connote 
something quite different from the legal concept of reasonableness in torts. 
Contract law does not simply say that parties have an obligation to behave 
reasonably. Instead, it says that they need to act in good faith. The definition 
in turn focuses on the elements of honesty and fairness, suggesting that the 
evaluation has as much to do with a party’s motives and intentions as its 
outward manifestation. 
The combination of the stable jural meaning and the flexible normative 
meaning with which common law concepts can be imbued creates an 
important equilibrium. This equilibrium allows the common law to guide 
behavior, promote reliance, and ground decisionmaking, while at the same 
time remaining open and receptive to competing normative theories and 
values. The equilibrium is relatively robust, which explains the endurance of 
the common law’s core architecture of concepts for centuries. It has enabled 
the common law to respond to changing social preferences and conditions 
without abolishing its core concepts.  
Of course, to introduce the requisite degree of adaptiveness to varying 
preferences and criteria, judges have over the years employed several legal 
techniques to vary the meaning of individual concepts without altogether 
destabilizing the core jural understanding and function of those concepts 
within common law doctrine. It is to the analysis of these techniques—which 
together reflect the dynamic side of the equilibrium just described—that we 
next turn.  
B. Normative Change in the Common Law 
The success of the common law—both as a body of law and as a method 
of lawmaking—can be attributed in large measure to its ability to keep up 
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with changing social values and preferences over extended periods of time. 
The common law, in other words, is susceptible to change. Yet change can 
come about in two distinct forms, and it is important to differentiate 
between them. On the one hand, change in the law can be at the level of 
legal rules (i.e., doctrinal).139 This form of change involves the process of 
modifying the jural content of individual rules, by making alterations at the 
margins, adding altogether new rules, or at times eliminating old rules. 
While this form of change is certainly present in the common law, it is 
somewhat less commonly seen, since extensive recourse to it runs the risk of 
undermining the very working of the common law, which in turn depends 
on the ideals of tradition and consistency at the level of doctrine. More 
frequently seen is the process of change at the normative level—best 
described as “normative change.”  
Unlike doctrinal change, normative change entails change occurring not 
in the actual content or structure of the common law’s individual doctrinal 
mechanisms but instead at the level of normative meaning, embodied in the 
common law’s conceptual structure.140 Normative change, in other words, 
operates through the interaction between the jural and normative meanings 
of the common law’s different concepts, which in turn enables common law 
doctrine to accommodate and affirm changing social values, and ideals 
without having to alter the actual doctrinal content of the law. Change of 
this kind is critical to the functioning and legitimacy of the common law 
insofar as it allows the law to keep up with the needs of society, and at the 
same time remain firmly anchored (as a doctrinal matter) in relatively stable 
practice. And it is once again the common law’s conceptual edifice that 
enables such normative change. 
One might, of course, object that the distinction we are drawing,  
between doctrinal and normative change, is less clear in practice than we 
make it out to be and that in many situations the two do in fact go hand in 
hand. A doctrinal change—involving, say, an alteration in an individual 
rule—might indeed be motivated by a change in normative ideal or value.141 
 
139 For a discussion of common law doctrinal change, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in 
the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); 
Rubin, supra note 4. 
140 For a previous account of normative change, see Kraus, supra note 97, at 327. 
141 As an example, consider the emergence of contributory negligence doctrine in tort law. 
See Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 254 (1908) (discussing the 
origins of contributory negligence in nineteenth-century tort law); Wex S. Malone, The Formative 
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 154-55 (1946) (linking the sudden rise of 
contributory negligence to the rapid expansion of railroads and tort lawsuits against common 
carriers). 
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We fully accept this possibility. Yet our simple point is that, at multiple 
points in its development, the common law goes through a process of 
change without exhibiting any overt or patent alterations to its form and 
jural structure. On the face of things, one might thus think that the law has 
remained altogether static, since no actual doctrinal modification has 
occurred. Our claim is merely that this need not be always true and that 
even when the common law does not exhibit variation in form and  
structure, it can nonetheless undergo important changes at the normative 
level, which can obviate the need for alterations at the doctrinal level.  
The process of normative change allows the common law to be overtly 
pluralist in its functioning. This form of “functional pluralism” stands in 
stark contrast to structural pluralism, a form of pluralism that is associated 
with the common law.142 Structural pluralism posits that the diversity of 
legal institutions and doctrines in the common law allows it to embrace a 
diversity of values, insofar as individuals are allowed to choose among these 
various institutions (and therefore values).143 Premised on the overarching 
value of autonomy, structural pluralism situates the common law’s pluralism 
in its doctrinal structure.144 In so doing, it is forced to rely entirely on 
doctrinal change in order to realize any alterations in social values and 
ideals. By contrast, functional pluralism—of the kind that we offer and 
defend here—situates the common law’s commitment to pluralism in its 
actual functioning rather than in its structure. It explains how the common 
law’s process of normative change, modulated through its conceptual 
architecture, allows individual doctrinal areas to affirm and embrace 
different normative values over time and context. 
We identify three principal ways in which normative change occurs in 
the common law through the use of legal concepts: interpretive change, 
interconceptual change, and additive change. Each of these methods of 
normative change relies fundamentally on the relationship between the jural 
and normative meanings of legal concepts, a relationship that judges 
effectively deploy to stabilize the content of the law while altering its 
contextual meaning. This Section describes and illustrates each of these 
mechanisms. 
 
142 Functional pluralism, as used here, should not be confused with its philosophical analog, 
an idea commonly associated with the work of Michael Lynch. See MICHAEL P. LYNCH, TRUE 
TO LIFE: WHY TRUTH MATTERS (2004) (developing a contextual theory of truth); Gila Sher, 
Functional Pluralism, 46 PHIL. BOOKS 311 (2005) (reviewing LYNCH, supra) (critiquing Michael 
Lynch’s functional pluralist account of truth). 
143 For a prominent recent account of structural pluralism, see DAGAN, supra note 101, at 193-223; 
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (2012). 
144 See Dagan, supra note 143, at 1424. 
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1. Interpretive Change 
Interpretive change is perhaps the most common mechanism through 
which normative change comes about in the common law. At its simplest, it 
entails a court imbuing a legal concept with new normative meaning while 
keeping the jural meaning of the concept static. All the same, the process 
involves a subtlety that is often ignored. 
As described previously, the jural and normative meanings of a legal 
 concept are in equilibrium with one another at any given point in time.145 
There thus exists a shared understanding of the jural meaning of the concept 
among most legal actors. In addition, concepts often have a dominant norma-
tive meaning that emerges from authoritative judicial pronouncements. The 
process of interpretive change involves altering the equilibrium between the 
concept’s jural meaning and normative meaning. In essence, the process can be 
broken down into two steps. In the first step, a court interprets the prevailing 
normative meaning of the legal concept in a way that brings it into close (if not 
complete) alignment with the concept’s jural meaning. In so doing, the open-
textured nature of the legal concept renders it indeterminate or vague insofar 
as its application to the specific context in question goes. This in turn produces 
the second step, which involves the court infusing the jural meaning of the 
concept with a new normative orientation. Almost always, the two steps occur 
contemporaneously even though they remain jurally distinct. 
The process of interpretive change is in many ways just as much a  
rhetorical strategy as it is a process of common law interpretation. In addition, 
since the focus is entirely on the internal dynamics of the legal concept (i.e., its 
duality of meaning), it is in essence a form of intraconceptual normative 
change. Thus, if a is the jural meaning of the concept, and n1 its prevailing 
normative meaning at time T1; at time T2 when the court seeks to introduce 
the normative change, the steps are: first, n1 is interpreted to be as close as 
possible to a (i.e., n1→a), as a result of which it is rendered indeterminate in 
application, requiring a second step, that a is in turn interpreted in terms of n2 
in order to render it applicable to the particular context in question. The 
process is best illustrated through a few examples. 
Consider first the common law of nuisance in England at the turn of the 
nineteenth century.146 At the turn of the century, nuisance law placed great 
emphasis on the concept of a “reasonable use” which operated as the 
lynchpin of the action in individual disputes.147 The concept invariably 
 
145 See supra text accompanying notes 141-142. 
146 See generally John P. S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution—Some Lessons 
from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1983). 
147 See William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 418-20 (1942). 
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entailed a reasonableness-based balancing exercise. Yet, by the mid-1800s, most 
courts had come to interpret the concept as weighing the plaintiff’s alleged 
harm against the “general and minimal standards of comfort.”148 The basic 
requirements of living were thus deemed to be the appropriate baseline against 
which the defendant’s actions were to be measured. Altogether missing in this 
analysis was any consideration of the potential benefits that the defendant’s 
actions might entail and the feasibility of its being performed or undertaken at 
an alternative location.149 Such an approach would obviously involve infusing 
the common law of nuisance with a distinctively utilitarian overtone insofar as 
it now measured the actual benefits of the defendant’s actions, regardless of the 
unfairness of the plaintiff’s harm, the primary concern under the pre-existing 
formulation of an “unreasonable interference.”  
The old approach—of focusing on the plaintiff ’s harm and measuring it 
against the minimal standards of comfort—looked entirely to the fairness of 
the plaintiff ’s claim, and operated under the basic recognition that the 
plaintiff had a pre-existing right to comfortably enjoy his property, with the 
only question remaining being whether such enjoyment was indeed possible 
in light of the defendant’s actions.150 This standard altogether disregarded 
any independent value that the defendant’s actions might produce, despite 
its causing the plaintiff actual harm. In the mid-nineteenth century, an 
important (but short-lived) English decision sought to alter this standard. 
In Hole v. Barlow, the court was motivated by utilitarian considerations, 
which it saw as altogether absent under the prior standard.151 The court thus 
observed that under the existing standard the “great manufacturing towns of 
England would be full of persons bringing actions for nuisances arising from 
the carrying on of noxious or offensive trades in their vicinity, to the great 
injury of the manufacturing and social interests of the community.”152 Instead 
of overtly claiming to then change the law to address this concern, the court 
thereafter looked to the concept of “reasonable use,” which courts had utilized 
in conjunction with the concept of the “unreasonable interference” in prior 
cases.153 It concluded that in situations of a “reasonable use, of a lawful trade 
in a convenient and proper place, even though some one may suffer  
annoyance from its being so carried on,” no claim for nuisance would lie.154 
 
148 Brenner, supra note 29, at 410. 
149 Id. 
150 See, e.g., Walter v. Selfe, (1851) 64 Eng. Rep. 849 (Ch.) 852; 4 De G. & Sm. 315, 322-24. 
151 (1858) 140 Eng. Rep. 1113 (C.P.) 1117; 4 C. B. N. S. 334, 342-43.  
152 Id. at 1114. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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Scholars have described Hole as a “radical departure from previous law” 
and have observed that “under the guise of semantic continuity, an actual 
change in the law itself did occur.”155 This is precisely the normative change 
that the court brought about. On the face of things, no overt change in the 
jural structure of nuisance doctrine occurred. The concept of “reasonable use” 
formed the focus of the court’s analysis. What the court in effect did was to 
treat the prevailing normative meaning of the concept (of reasonable use) as 
sufficiently indeterminate (i.e., as being no different from its jural meaning), 
which required no more than a balancing exercise that scrutinized the use 
against a baseline. It then proceeded to eliminate (or solve) that indeterminacy 
by infusing the concept with a new normative meaning, which would satisfy 
the minimal requirements of the concept’s jural meaning. “General and 
minimal” standards of comfort, which formed the pre-existing normative 
meaning, was first equated with the sufficiently vague idea of “reasonable 
use,” which the court then replaced with “convenient and proper place” as the 
new normative standard that would enable the doctrine to now accommodate 
avowedly utilitarian considerations.156 Later courts, to be sure, came to disagree 
with the court’s decision in Hole, preferring instead to emphasize fairness—
rather than utilitarian—considerations in the working of nuisance law. 157 
Interestingly enough, their reasoning too relied on the ideas of “reasonable use” 
and “unreasonable interference,” thereby effectively preserving the doctrinal 
content of nuisance law and the jural meaning of the legal concept in question 
while nonetheless effecting an important normative change.158 
A second example is seen in the law of riparian rights as it evolved in 
nineteenth-century America. By the early nineteenth century, riparian 
rights in the United States generally followed what scholars describe as the 
“natural right theory” or the idea of a “natural flow.”159 According to this 
approach, courts allowed riparian owners to use a stream at will, as long as 
they did not interfere with the natural flow of the stream beyond minimal 
levels needed for their domestic use, agriculture, or animal husbandry.160 In 
 
155 Brenner, supra note 29, at 409, 411. 
156 Hole, 140 Eng. Rep. at 1114. 
157 See St. Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. (H.L.) 1483; 11 H.L.C. 642; 
Bamford v. Turnley, (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex.); 3 B. & S. 66. 
158 See, e.g., Bamford, 122 Eng. Rep. at 30 (“It may be observed that . . . there is a want of 
precision, especially in the words ‘reasonable’ and ‘convenient,’ which renders its meaning by no 
means clear.”). 
159 See JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 129-40 
(2004) (detailing the development of natural rights theory); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 34-35 (1977) (explaining the natural 
flow theory in the United States).  
160 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 35-40. 
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essence, this approach emphasized the riparian property owners’ exclusive 
dominion and the normative ideal of owner-autonomy. Considerations of 
efficiency, optimal social use, and the like found little place under this 
approach. 
A few early courts had sought to deviate from the natural flow approach and 
introduce in its stead a balancing test that examined the relative efficiencies of 
the owner’s use and the neighbor’s use.161 These deviations were met with 
immense criticism from scholars at the time.162 They were seen as abrupt 
transformations— and therefore outliers— in the development of the law. All 
the same, they rendered salient the importance of moving the law in the 
direction of affirming utilitarian, efficiency-based considerations, by balancing 
a riparian owner’s entitlement against the needs of downstream uses and 
economic development that might maximize overall social welfare (i.e., 
utilitarianism over autonomy). It was not until Justice Story’s famous opinion 
in Tyler v. Wilkinson, delivered in 1827, that these normative considerations 
were made an actual part of the formal law of riparian ownership, unlike the 
prior efforts that had sought to change the doctrine altogether.163 Morton 
Horwitz describes Justice Story’s opinion as reflecting the reality that 
“[c]ommon lawyers are more comfortable with a process of gradually giving 
new meanings to old formulas than with explicitly casting the old doctrines 
aside.”164 This was in essence a process of interpretive normative change. 
Justice Story begins his opinion by affirming the natural flow approach 
as the default position on riparian ownership.165 He then goes on to make 
the following observation, which has since been credited with effecting an 
important alteration in the law:  
When I speak of this common right, I do not mean to be understood as 
holding the doctrine, that there can be no diminution whatsoever, and no 
obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor, in the use 
of the water as it flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use of it. 
There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is common to all, a 
reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is, 
whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or not. . . . The diminu-
tion, retardation, or acceleration, not positively and sensibly injurious by 
 
161 See, e.g., Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213, 218-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 
Cai. 307, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
162 See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW, IN RELATION TO 
WATER-COURSES 40-41 (1824) (describing these developments as “obviously unjust”). 
163 24 F. Cas. 472 (Story, Circuit Justice, D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). 
164 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 38 (emphasis added). 
165 See Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474.  
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diminishing the value of the common right, is an implied element in the right of 
using the stream at all. The law here, as in many other cases, acts with a 
reasonable reference to public convenience and general good, and it is not 
betrayed into a narrow strictness, subversive of common sense, nor into an 
extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights.166 
In this paragraph, Justice Story is credited with introducing the idea of a 
reasonable riparian use into the analysis of riparian rights and with moving 
the law in the direction of recognizing efficiency and social welfare consid-
erations as part of the doctrine.167 The genius of his approach lies in the 
simple fact that overtly, he effected no change whatsoever in the doctrine or 
applicable concepts themselves. Horwitz describes it as the “classically 
transitional judicial opinion.”168 
On closer analysis, we see how exactly the opinion introduces its desired 
normative change interpretively. The prior law had emphasized the existence 
of a riparian owner’s “right” and the need to protect it against interferences, 
which were characterized as “injuries.” Relying on the idea that every infrac-
tion of a right (e.g., the right to exclude) was an injury at law, the natural flow 
theory rendered such injuries actionable.169 The jural meaning of the concept 
thus entailed the idea of an actionable interference (e.g., “injuria sine damno”),170 
and the pre-existing normative meaning situated that concept in the notion of 
natural rights and the value of owner autonomy. In Tyler, Justice Story played 
on the legal concept of “injury” by admitting that its basic jural meaning 
rendered it contextually indeterminate, thereby allowing him to infuse it with 
the idea of actual harm (i.e., damage and compensable loss). In this vein, the 
leading historical account of water rights at common law argues that the 
opinion successfully “transforms strict natural rights into reasonable rights by 
playing on the ambiguity of the notion of ‘injury’, both at law and in common 
speech.”171 In essence, then, Justice Story’s reasoning accepts the injury-based 
rationale of the test but proceeds to treat the idea of an injury as an empirical 
question, based on the “value” of the use and the right at issue.172 In so doing, 
 
166 Id. (emphasis added). 
167 See GETZLER, supra note 159, at 275-76; HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 39; Carol M. Rose, 
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 285-88 
(1990). 
168 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 39. 
169 For an excellent discussion of the jural moves here, see GETZLER, supra note 159, at 61-63. 
170 Id. at 62. 
171 Id. at 275. 
172 See Tyler v. Willkinson, 24 F. Cas.472, 474 (Story, Circuit Justice, D.R.I. 1827) (No. 
14,312) (emphasizing the diminution in “value” of the right). 
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it successfully infused the doctrine with distinctively utilitarian considerations 
through the process of interpretive normative change. 
Interpretive normative change is thus a fairly well-known method of 
infusing the common law with new normative ideas and content, without 
actually altering the doctrinal content and jural structure of the rules 
themselves. As we saw, it relies very heavily on the common law’s conceptual 
structure and works with the jural indeterminacy of legal concepts to take 
them in new normative directions as circumstances demand. 
2. Interconceptual Change 
The second method through which normative change comes about in the 
common law is best described as the process of interconceptual change (or 
as interconceptual salience alteration). In basic terms, this mechanism works 
by altering the relative salience of different concepts, all of which are 
embedded in a common law doctrine, to the working of that particular 
doctrine. Whereas interpretive change effects an alteration of a concept’s own 
normative meaning, interconceptual change accepts a concept’s prevailing 
normative meaning as a given but either enhances or reduces the influence of 
that concept (and its normative meaning) in the overall scheme of the 
doctrine. 
Common law doctrines routinely entail multiple elements or factors, all of 
which courts are required to consider during their analysis and application of 
the doctrine.173 Each of these elements in turn commonly embodies distinct 
legal concepts, which in turn contain their own jural and normative meanings 
as previously described. In interpreting a doctrine, courts do not give factors, 
elements, and concepts equal weight. Indeed, just the opposite is true. In 
applying a multi-element doctrine, courts usually emphasize one (or more) 
elements of a doctrine over others, either explicitly or implicitly. Insofar as 
the concepts underlying each of the elements reflect different normative 
ideals, this process of emphasizing or deemphasizing one element over 
another has the direct effect of raising or lowering that particular concept’s 
salience and its associated normative value for the overall doctrine. 
Assume that a common law doctrine contains four independent (and cumu-
lative) elements (e1, e2, e3, and e4), each of which in turn embodies a distinct legal 
concept (c1, c2, c3, c4). If the concepts emphasize varying normative ideals and 
values (n1, n2, n3, n4), the process of emphasizing or deemphasizing one or more 
 
173 For a particularly harsh criticism of multifactor tests and doctrines in the law, see RICHARD 
A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 262 (2013) (“[W]hen the factors are numerous, unweighted, 
and open-ended . . . , a multifactor test is an invitation to the exercise of uncanalized discretionary 
authority.”). 
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elements (e.g., e3) of the doctrine as more important than the others has the 
direct effect of rendering the normative values associated with the concept (c3) 
contained in that element (n3) more salient and influential within the overall 
analysis of the doctrine. Indeed, we see this occurring somewhat frequently in 
the common law, when courts come to treat one element of a multi-element 
doctrine as more important than others and in the process raise the salience of 
the legal concept embedded within that particular element. The following 
examples are illustrative. 
The doctrine of adverse possession is without a doubt the most striking 
and controversial way of acquiring property rights in realty and personality.174 
It effectively allows trespassers to divest rightful owners of their ownership 
rights and acquire good title to assets that they initially wrongfully possessed. 
For this to occur, the doctrine requires that the possession be actual, open and 
notorious, hostile (or adverse), exclusive, and continuous for the statutory 
period.175 These requirements are considered the “elements” of the doctrine, 
but they each originate in an important conceptual device with its own jural 
and normative content.176  
Given the somewhat draconian nature of adverse possession as a mecha-
nism of acquiring ownership, as a historical matter courts treated the element 
of hostility as especially important in the analysis since it allowed them to 
police the behavior and motives of the claimant.177 The normative ideal of 
fairness remained at the core of this emphasis. This perspective reigned 
supreme when land records were poor and innocent third parties stumbled 
into others’ land and cultivated it, believing in good faith that there was no 
wrongdoing involved in their actions.178 The law of adverse possession 
sought to benefit these putatively innocent occupiers by protecting their 
labor and reliance interests. Jurally, the legal concept of hostility focused on 
the intent of the adverse possessor towards the original owner and the asset 
 
174 See, e.g., Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135 (1918) 
(“Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft or robbery, a primitive 
method of acquiring land without paying for it.”).  
175 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.02 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2014); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE 
OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 34-35 (2010); see also Henry Winthrop 
Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L.J. 219, 219 (1919).  
176 16 POWELL, supra note 175, §§ 91.02-.07. 
177 See Helmholz, supra note 33, at 337-341 (discussing the role of hostility and mistaken belief 
in the adverse possession analysis); William Sternberg, The Element of Hostility in Adverse 
Possession, 6 TEMPLE L.Q. 207, 207 (1931) (describing hostility as the “most frequently contested 
element of adverse possession”).  
178 See Sternberg, supra note 177, at 215 (citing precedent from 1840 adopting a largely  
analogous view). 
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in question, and examined the adverse possessor’s state of mind. Courts 
emphasizing the element originally seemed to suggest that considerations of 
fairness required that only adverse possessors who acted in good faith, on the 
honest albeit erroneous belief that they were possessing their own land, could 
avail themselves of the doctrine.179 These courts used the element (and its 
underlying concept of “hostility” or that the possession be “adverse”) to deny 
other claimants any relief; again, in the belief that the fairness ideals underlying 
the doctrine were best served by this approach.180  
More recently, the fairness justification for adverse possession has begun 
to lose ground and an efficiency-based rationale has begun to gain sway. In 
this perspective, the goal of adverse possession is to put land to productive 
use, accomplishing this by simultaneously (1) penalizing slothful owners 
who allow their land to lay fallow and (2) incentivizing third parties to seek 
such fallow land and make efficient use of it.181 On this view, not only was 
the good faith (i.e., mistaken belief ) of the possessor irrelevant, but an 
affirmative bad faith—wherein the actor knew he or she was trespassing on 
another’s property—was preferable. A minority of courts thus tried altering 
the very normative meaning of the concept of hostility to require a showing 
of bad faith, all in order to further their utilitarian emphasis.182 This process 
was in essence an attempt to bring about normative change interpretively. 
 
179 This position came to be known as the Connecticut rule. See French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 
445 (1831) (“The possession is not the less adverse, because the person possessed intentionally, though 
innocently. But in the moral nature of the act, there is undoubtedly a difference, when the possessor 
knowingly enters by wrong.”). For further discussion, see Helmholz, supra note 33, at 337-49. For 
cases accepting this position, see Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969); West v. Tilley, 306 
N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Brehm v. Johnson, 531 P.2d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). 
180 See, e.g., Eddings v. Black, 602 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (concluding that 
where claimant had knowledge of a prior claim (i.e., was not acting in good faith), the adverse 
possession claim was “wanting in intrinsic fairness”). 
181 See Fennell, supra note 33, at 1059-60 (describing the true niche goal of adverse possession 
as “moving land into the hands of a (much) higher-valuing user, where ordinary markets cannot 
accomplish that task”). But see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 2419, 2435-36 (2001) (critiquing this rationale by discussing times when “productive use can be 
undesirable”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1122, 1130-31 (1985) (offering a similar critique). 
182 This approach came to be known as the Maine rule. See Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 27 
A. 149, 150-51 (Me. 1893) (“It is not merely the existence of a mistake, but the presence or absence of 
the requisite intention to claim title, that fixes the character of the entry and determines the question 
of disseisin.”), overruled by Dombkowski v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599 (Me. 2006); see also Sternberg, supra 
note 177, at 213-14 (discussing the early Maine rule, where “there can be no adverse possession when 
there is a mistaken belief of ownership”). For an argument that efficiency demands an adherence to 
this rule, see Fennell, supra note 33, at 1038-39. 
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In due course, however, this approach failed to garner support.183 When this 
occurred, advocates of the normative change—towards utilitarianism—
adopted an alternative strategy—namely, seeking such change through an 
interconceptual salience alteration. 
Instead of seeking to reinterpret the concept of hostility in terms of bad 
faith, courts came to adopt the view that the element of hostility, with its 
emphasis on the possessor’s state of mind, was altogether irrelevant to the 
adverse possession analysis.184 In its place, they elevated the element of 
actual possession and the concept of “actuality” underlying it.185 Jurally, 
actual possession requires the court to undertake a factual and empirical 
examination of the nature of the possessor’s use to see if the possessor 
behaves as a standard owner would.186 In a vast majority of cases, all actual 
possession required was the enclosure or improvement of the relevant tract. 
Clearly, the concept of actuality is more consistent with the utilitarian 
justification for adverse possession, insofar as it privileges the possessor’s 
actual use of the land. By emphasizing the importance of “actuality” over 
“hostility” in adverse possession, this approach ensured that the doctrine as 
a whole came to affirm the utilitarian ideal of effective land use rather than 
the doctrine’s original fairness goals.187 One element and concept (i.e., 
actual possession, and actuality) was emphasized, while another (i.e., 
hostility) was simultaneously deemphasized, in the process rendering salient 
the normative ideals associated with the former. 
A second example of interconceptual normative change is seen in the  
federal common law of copyright, specifically the famed fair use doctrine. The 
fair use doctrine sanctions certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted works 
 
183 R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 65, 83 (1986) (discussing how American courts have moved away from the bad faith 
requirement). 
184 See Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (observing that the 
adverse possessor’s “subjective belief regarding his true interest in the land and his intent to 
dispossess or not dispossess another is irrelevant to this determination”); 16 POWELL, supra note 
175, § 91.05[1][a] (discussing the majority understanding of hostile as referring to actions and not 
intent). 
185 Chaplin, 676 P.2d at 436 (“The nature of his possession will be determined solely on the 
basis of the manner in which he treats the property.”).  
186 16 POWELL, supra note 175, § 91.03 (“[T]he claimant must use and possess the land to the 
same extent as a record owner would, in light of the property’s particular attributes.”). 
187 The clearest statement to this effect is to be found in a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Washington. See Chaplin, 676 P.2d at 435 (“The doctrine of adverse possession was formulated at 
law for the purpose of, among others, assuring maximum utilization of land, encouraging the 
rejection of stale claims and, most importantly, quieting titles.”). 
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that would otherwise constitute copyright infringement.188 In adjudicating fair 
use cases, courts are required to consider four factors: First, they must consider 
the purpose of the defendant’s allegedly infringing use, including whether the 
use is commercial or not and whether it is transformative in nature.189 Second, 
they must take account of the nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.190 
Third, they have to weigh the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s 
appropriation.191 Finally, they must assess the copying’s impact on the actual 
and potential market for the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.192 
While fair use is today codified in the Copyright Act, it emerged from 
the decisions of common law and equity courts.193 Indeed, Justice Story is 
commonly credited with originating the doctrine in his now famous opinion 
in Folsom v. Marsh.194 Even while codifying the fair use doctrine, Congress 
intended that courts continue to develop it as they had done before, in 
traditional common law style through the “process of accretion.”195 Indeed, 
the legislative history accompanying the codification indicates that Congress 
mandated that “the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular 
situations on a case-by-case basis.”196 A review of the courts’ application and 
development of fair use jurisprudence since its codification reveals an 
ongoing tussle between the normative ideals of fairness and autonomy, and 
efficiency.197 And in this tussle, we see courts effectively employing the 
mechanism of interconceptual change to mold the doctrine along the lines 
of their preferred normative goal. 
Early in the development of the doctrine, the rough idea of fairness—
manifested in the notion of consumer autonomy—dominated the framing of 
 
188 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an  
infringement of copyright.”). See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW (1985). 
189 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
190 Id. § 107(2) (“[T]he nature of the copyrighted work.”). 
191 Id. § 107(3) (“[T]he amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole.”). 
192 Id. § 107(4). 
193 See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1379-87, 1393-1409 
(2011) (arguing that the true origins of the doctrine can be traced back to common law and equity 
decisions in the period between 1741 and 1841). 
194 9 F. Cas. 342 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4901); see also Oren Bracha, 
The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 
118 YALE L.J. 186, 229-30 (2008) (discussing the impact of Folsom v. Marsh on copyright thinking). 
See generally L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998) 
(criticizing the decision in Folsom v. Marsh).  
195 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
196 Id. 
197 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 
347, 350-54 (1997). 
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the doctrine. One of the principal ways in which this was realized by courts was 
through an emphasis on the first fair use factor, which looks at the purpose of 
the defendant’s use. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,198 the 
Supreme Court did precisely this. In emphasizing that the defendant’s actions 
amounted to a fair use, the Court focused on the first factor and tied it to the 
concept of commercialism, noting that “every commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”199 By converting commercialism into 
the cornerstone of the first fair use factor and implicitly making it the most 
salient factor in the analysis, the Court was able to find for the defendants, since 
their use was for a noncommercial purpose. In the process, the Court’s ideals of 
consumer autonomy and fairness were emphasized. 
A year later, the Supreme Court revisited the fair use doctrine in Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.200 As scholars have long pointed 
out, the Court’s decision in the case was unquestionably swayed by the 
effect that the defendant’s actions had had on the market for the plaintiff ’s 
work. When the defendant copied and published its work, the plaintiff lost 
its lucrative book deal and a host of other economic benefits to which it 
would have otherwise been entitled.201 In the Court’s view, finding the 
defendant’s actions to be fair use would be inefficient and harmful to social 
welfare. In its own analysis now, the Court unequivocally proclaimed that 
the fourth (as opposed to the first) fair use factor was “undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use.”202 The fourth factor has long 
been known to embody the concept of “market effect,” which entails a 
scrutiny of the economic harm that the defendant’s copying imposes on the 
plaintiff.203 In no uncertain terms, the Court even connected the concept of 
market effect to efficiency considerations, citing to economic literature on 
the question.204 Upon so doing, the Court concluded that the fair use 
analysis needed to emphasize the normative ideal of economic efficiency, 
which in the end favored the plaintiff. 
In both instances, we see the Court raising the salience of one element 
or factor over others in the analysis and then highlighting an important 
conceptual device embedded within its preferred factor. Then, using the 
normative ideals associated with that concept (or its normative meaning), 
 
198 464 U.S. 417 (1984), superseded on other grounds by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
199 Id. at 451. 
200 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
201 Id. at 567. 
202 Id. at 566. 
203 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
204 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9. 
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the Court is able to render that normative goal pervasively influential in the 
overall fair use analysis. In Sony, the Court emphasized the concept of 
“commercialism” over all other concepts, while in Harper & Row, the Court 
emphasized “market effect” over commercialism and other concepts or 
ideals. This was in essence the process of interconceptual normative change. 
We see the Court continuing to use the vehicle of interconceptual change 
in later fair use decisions as well. The 1990s saw far-reaching changes in the 
production and dissemination of expressive content. The emergence of new 
technologies allowed creators to freely borrow from pre-existing works in the 
process of creating new ones, a paradigm colorfully described by some as 
“remix.”205 This paradigm gained instant popularity in the world of music. 
Creators in other areas were quick to follow suit and many academics called 
on the copyright system to enable the new creative paradigm on grounds of 
individual autonomy.  
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,206 the Court was asked to determine 
the legality of this practice using the fair use doctrine. In deciding to empha-
size the ideal of individual autonomy in the creative process, the Court chose to 
simultaneously deemphasize both the notion of commercialism and efficiency 
considerations standing on their own. Drawing on academic literature, it thus 
developed the concept of “transformative[ness],” which it read into the first fair 
use factor.207 Upon doing so, the Court then reasoned that this concept—
embedded into the first factor—was of such importance that “the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, 
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use,”208 in effect 
suggesting that the concept of transformativeness ought to trump both 
commercialism and market efficiency. Once again then, we see the use of the 
interconceptual method in fair use in order to realize a normative change in 
the doctrine: from market efficiency back to individual creative autonomy.209 
Interconceptual change is thus a frequently adopted mode of normative 
change in relation to common law doctrines that consist of multiple elements 
or factors. It relies heavily on the connection between each element and a 
specific conceptual device embedded within it and works by altering the 
 
205 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE 
IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008). 
206 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
207 Id. at 579. 
208 Id. 
209 See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 941 
(2002) (associating transformativeness with free speech); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: 
How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 549-52 
(2004) (discussing the connection between transformativeness and free speech). 
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relative salience to the doctrine of the different elements—and with it the 
different concepts and their normative underpinnings. 
3. Additive Change 
A third mechanism of concept-reliant normative change in the common 
law involves the process of introducing an altogether new conceptual device 
into an area of doctrine, with the express understanding that the new 
concept embodies a normative ideal that is seen as beneficial and worthy of 
consideration within that particular area. In other words, it entails the 
addition of a new concept to the area in question, in the process imbuing 
that concept with a specific jural—and normative—meaning.  
The concept being introduced to the area in question need not be  
completely new in the sense of being altogether invented for this particular 
purpose. To the contrary, in most situations, the concept is one that is taken 
from another area of doctrine and modified sufficiently to meet the purposes 
of the new area. It therefore can partake of what scholars have described as the 
phenomenon of interdoctrinal borrowing.210 What is important to appreciate 
in the process of additive change, however, is that the introduction of the new 
concept is rarely ever open-ended and purely jural—in the sense of merely 
injecting the concept into the area without a clear sense of how it will be used 
or the normative ideals with which it will be infused. To the contrary, the very 
molding of the concept imbues it with a distinct jural meaning and a  
sufficiently stable normative meaning (for the area), which its originators see 
as important to the substantive doctrinal area in question. 
As mechanisms of normative change in the common law go, additive change 
is perhaps the most overt and direct. It is for this reason that it is somewhat 
rare, especially in comparison to both interpretive and interconceptual change, 
both of which are far subtler in nature. Additive change in the common law 
amounts to a direct process of judicial lawmaking, which common law courts 
are only rarely comfortable admitting to, whereas both interpretive and 
interconceptual change can be seen as mechanisms of legal interpretation that 
fit well with the assumptions of the declaratory theory of common law 
adjudication. The following examples illustrate the working of this method. 
The law of landlord–tenant relations has long been characterized by a  
disparity in bargaining positions between landlord and tenant. This disparity 
 
210 See generally Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust 
Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002) (offering a critique of the 
interdoctrinal borrowing of concepts and rules); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional 
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010) (providing examples of interdoctrinal borrowing in the 
area of constitutional law). 
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is especially acute in the context of residential housing where landlords are 
seen to be motivated almost exclusively by economic considerations, while 
tenants are driven by concerns that affect their everyday living situation.211 As 
scholars have noted, efforts to cure this inequality have characterized the 
very development of landlord–tenant law in the United States.212 One of 
the most important developments in this regard emerged in the year 1970 
under the doctrine of the implied warranty of habitability, which in turn 
revolved around the concept of “habitability.”213  
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp., a set of residential tenants sought to 
withhold their rent payments when the landlord refused to make a series of 
important repairs to the premises. 214  Acknowledging the gross disparity 
between landlords and tenants in the region, Judge Skelly Wright approached 
his analysis with the observation that “the common law itself must recognize 
the landlord’s obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition.”215 He 
then concluded that “a warranty of habitability [must] be implied into all 
contracts for urban dwellings,” and that the content of the local housing code 
should inform this warranty.216 Thus emerged the doctrine of the implied 
warranty of habitability, which imposed a new duty on all residential landlords 
to ensure that their premises were maintained in a habitable condition at all 
times. This duty in turn originated in the concept of “habitability,” reflecting 
the jural idea that a putative residential dwelling had to be evaluated by certain 
external criteria for its suitability as a residence.  
Javins is universally credited with having introduced the implied warranty 
of habitability, and the very concept of habitability, into the common law of 
residential leases.217 In addition, there remains little uncertainty about what 
Judge Wright was seeking to achieve through its introduction. He was driven 
almost entirely by the desire to cure what he saw as the substantive inequality 
embodied in the residential landlord–tenant relationship and to imbue the 
 
211 See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord–Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. 
REV. 503, 508-11 (1982) (discussing this disparity). 
212 See, e.g., 2 POWELL, supra note 175, § 16B.01 (discussing the landlord–tenant revolution); 
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord–Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 517, 545 (1984) (attributing the development of landlord–tenant law to societal 
forces aimed at improving the perceived inadequacies of housing law). 
213 See Super, supra note 37, at 451 (describing the events leading up to the development of 
the implied warranty of habitability); see also James Charles Smith, Tenant Remedies for Breach of 
Habitability: Tort Dimensions of a Contract Concept, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 505, 534-46 (1987) (rooting 
the concept of habitability in tort law). 
214 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
215 Id. at 1077. 
216 Id. at 1080 (footnote omitted). 
217 See 2 POWELL, supra note 175, § 16B.04[2][a]. 
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regime governing that relationship with the ideal of substantive transactional 
equality. Transactional equality was thus his principal normative goal, and the 
concept of habitability was a perfect vehicle for it. As Javins conceived of it, 
the concept of habitability was meant to force not just an evaluation of the 
premises but also an evaluation in terms of its tenant-friendliness, so as to 
ensure equality in contracting positions. The concept of habitability—as 
articulated by Javins and later cases—was thus intrinsically aligned with the 
normative ideals of tenant protection and tenant equality, and it overtly 
introduced these ideals into the law. 
A second example involves the common law’s set of interests that are 
identified by the concept of “quasi-property.” In a variety of situations, the 
common law allows an individual to exclude others from an object or resource, 
without endowing that individual with the full set of rights over that object 
that are characterized by the idea of property (e.g., the right to alienate).218 In 
these situations, common law courts have employed the concept of “quasi-
property” to develop a jural basis for the exclusion and, in addition, have 
endowed the idea with a specific normative meaning contextually. The most 
prominent instance where this has occurred is in relation to the law of unfair 
competition, the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine.219 
In International News Service v. Associated Press, the question was whether 
a collector of time-sensitive factual information (i.e., news) could prevent a 
competitor from freeriding on its collection efforts until such time as it 
published its findings and reaped the economic benefits from its efforts.220 
Recognizing a regular ownership interest in such information would have 
entailed a set of consequences that the Court wanted to avoid—such as 
whether the right could be used to control the flow of such information, 
whether members of the consuming public could be precluded from using 
it, etc.221 Instead, what the Court nonetheless recognized as crucial was 
developing a mechanism to prevent one competitor from freeriding on the 
efforts of another, in the recognition that such freeriding was economically 
harmful to the news-collection industry as a whole.222 The Court in Interna-
tional News Service therefore developed the misappropriation doctrine, 
which allowed for an action to be brought against a freeriding competitor 
for a limited duration. Firmly embedded within the doctrine was the 
 
218 Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 38, at 1891. 
219 For a fuller account of the doctrine, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring 
Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011) [hereinafter Balganesh, “Hot News”] 
220 248 U.S. 215, 232 (1918). 
221 See Balganesh, “Hot News,” supra note 219, at 429-38 (providing a historical account of the 
development of the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine).  
222 Id. at 438-56. 
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concept of quasi-property, which the Court used to describe the nature of 
the interest that the plaintiff newsgatherer had over the information in 
question. Or, as Justice Pitney famously put it in his majority opinion: 
Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which both parties are 
seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can 
fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded 
as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the public.223 
It is crucial to appreciate what the Court was doing by introducing the concept 
of quasi-property into the discussion. First, it was offering up a jural basis for 
the claimant’s entitlement to exclude a freeriding competitor. Quasi-property 
represents a relational entitlement that situationally entitles its holder to 
exclude another from an identifiable resource.224 Second, the Court was also 
endowing this interest with a distinct normative basis—rooted in the avoidance 
of freeriding, in order to preserve the efficiencies of the newsgathering 
industry.225 The normative basis of the concept, as the Court applied it to the 
case, was thus rooted in utilitarian considerations. It is questionable whether a 
desultory reliance on the idea of property might have enabled the Court to 
inject distinctively utilitarian—as opposed to moral—considerations into the 
analysis. The concept of quasi-property proved to be a perfect addition to the 
debate in order to realize this objective. 
Interestingly enough, the concept of quasi-property has been introduced 
into other doctrinal contexts, where it has been understood as embodying 
the same jural meaning but with a different normative content. Its role in 
grounding the right of sepulcher is a good example. The right of sepulcher 
refers to the rights that family members have over the corpse of a deceased 
relative.226 These rights normally extend to being able to bury the corpse, 
perform all necessary last rites, and determine how to dispose of the mortal 
remains. It also, very importantly, entitles a holder to commence an action 
against third parties for unauthorized interferences with the corpse, on the 
assumption that such interferences produce extensive mental anguish for 
the relatives.227  
 
223 International News Service, 248 U.S. at 236. 
224 Balganesh, Quasi-Property, supra note 38, at 1891. 
225 For a fuller discussion of this reality and the background conditions that motivated the 
Court’s reasoning, see Balganesh, “Hot News,” supra note 219, at 443-48. 
226 For an extended treatment, see Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 971 (1999). 
227 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984). 
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In developing these rights, common law courts across the United States 
have relied extensively on the concept of quasi-property, understanding it to 
represent a non-ownership-based entitlement over an object (i.e., the corpse) 
that entitles its holder to exclude others from it.228 Interestingly, though, their 
normative reason for relying on the concept appears to have been largely non-
utilitarian. It was rooted instead in the interest of protecting family members 
from the emotional and psychological anguish that interferences with the 
corpse might generate, without overtly commodifying the entitlement as a 
form of property. 229  The concept of quasi-property in this context—as 
developed by courts—thus assumed a different normative meaning from the 
concept as used in the unfair competition setting. Here, it partook of distinctly 
moral concerns, even though its jural structure remained the same as in the 
unfair competition context. This divergence in normative meaning between 
the two areas brings home the core idea described earlier about the duality of 
meanings that concepts routinely carry. This is not to suggest that courts 
introducing the concept into the discussion of sepulcher rights were doing so 
without a clear sense of the concept’s intended normative meaning. To the 
contrary, they saw the concept as sufficiently jurally stable so as to enable it to 
carry their intended normative meaning, rooted as it was in considerations of 
dignity and emotional harm. In so doing, the concept served their purpose of 
introducing a dignitary entitlement over the object into the area without 
simultaneously commodifying that relationship. In short, the concept effected 
an additive normative change. 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the process of additive change, 
unlike the two previous mechanisms of change, usually involves a direct 
doctrinal change to the law as well. In this respect, additive change therefore 
combines both mechanisms of doctrinal and normative change. Nevertheless, 
its primary impetus unquestionably remains the need to introduce new or 
 
228 See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Under Arkansas law, the next 
of kin does have a quasi-property right in a dead body.”); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (recognizing the quasi-property right in a dead person’s body 
“for the limited purpose of determining who shall have its custody for burial”); Burney v. 
Children’s Hosp. in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897) (recognizing a quasi-right of property in a 
dead body); Brown v. Maplewood Cemetery Ass’n, 89 N.W. 872, 879 (Minn. 1902) (“[W]hile a 
dead body is not property, in the strict sense of the common law, it is a quasi property . . . .”); 
Hackett v. Hackett, 26 A. 42, 43 (R.I. 1893) (recognizing a widow had a quasi-property right in 
her dead husband’s body). 
229 See, e.g., Hackett, 26. A. at 43 (“This is not a question of contract, nor of liability, but of 
sentiment and propriety.”); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237-38 
(1872) (“[T]here is no right of property in a dead body . . . . Yet the burial of the dead is a 
subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of 
actual property.”). 
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underemphasized normative goals into an area of law. It is therefore indelibly a 
form of normative change in the law. 
*      *      * 
While the three mechanisms of normative change described here may not 
exhaust the entire gamut of mechanisms through which the common law works 
in normative change, they do nonetheless represent the most prominent and 
commonly seen mechanisms. In addition, common law courts invariably weigh 
a variety of different considerations when choosing amongst them, such as the 
extensiveness of the intended change, the acceptance of judicial lawmaking 
within the area, the driving force behind the change in exogenous normative 
conditions, the likelihood of its persistence over time and context, and their 
ability to analogize to other areas where such change has been brought about. 
Upon a weighing of these considerations, common law courts then embark 
upon one or more of the previously described strategies, occasionally employing 
them in tandem. In addition, as noted before, the dynamics of the mechanisms 
at issue are often fairly subtle, with courts rarely ever making their reliance on a 
particular mechanism explicit or obvious. The table below represents a simple 
comparison of the three methods described in this Section. 
 
Table 1: Comparing the Mechanisms of Change 
  
Interpretive 
Change
 
Interconceptual 
Change
 
Additive  
Change 
 
Method of 
Change
 
Interpretation 
 
Salience alteration 
 
Novel addition 
 
Subtlety of 
Process 
 
Very subtle 
 
 
Less subtle and  
somewhat direct 
 
Overt 
 
Endurance 
of Change 
Subtlety risks 
short-lived 
change 
Directness ensures 
some path  
dependence 
Most enduring since 
express overruling 
required 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
Having described the structure of legal concepts, and the critical role that 
they play in anchoring the common law, enabling normative change in 
common law doctrines, and in grounding common law reasoning and legal 
disagreement around a core minimum of shared understanding, this Part 
addresses the implications and consequences that flow from our account. In 
particular, we address three important implications that flow from our prior 
analysis. 
A. Conceptualism, Formalism, and Realism 
Ever since Legal Realism has become a dominant mode of analysis 
among American legal scholars in diverse subject areas, the study of the 
common law as a coherent body of law has fallen out of favor.230 Individual 
common law subjects such as property, torts, and contracts are discussed and 
analyzed almost exclusively as merely embodying important normative goals 
and ideals.231 The actual jural content of the common law as an integrated 
body of law, embodied in its multifarious concepts and devices, is treated as 
a largely contingent feature of the system.232 Additionally, all too often this 
jural apparatus is conceived of as open to pure manipulation by courts and 
litigants.233 Some even suggest that common law concepts are devoid of all 
jural significance and independent meaning.234 One torts scholar’s argument 
that the legal concept of foreseeability might as well be called “strawberry 
shortcake,” because it is so open-ended as to be rendered altogether meaning-
less, is a particularly good (and extreme) example of this phenomenon.235 In 
short, Legal Realism—at least in its extreme version—has succeeded in 
 
230 See ALAN BRUDNER WITH JENNIFER M. NADLER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON 
LAW 48 (2d ed. 2013) (“The fragmentation of the common-law tradition has spawned a corre-
sponding crisis in the intellectual endeavour to understand it.”). 
231 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1640, 1641-42 (2012) (describing this trend as the emergence of “brass tacks” pragmatism). 
232 Dworkin put it best when he characterized followers of this approach as “nominalists.” See 
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25, 26-27 
(Robert S. Summers ed., 1968); see also MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 208-47 (1982) (discussing previous uses of the term “nominal-
ism”). 
233 See L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 434 (1934). 
234 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 27 (1930) (describing legal 
concepts as “weasel words”). 
235 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in 
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 740 (2005) (“Indeed, one torts 
professor teaches that foreseeability might as well be called ‘strawberry shortcake,’ having been 
bent, muddled, and co-opted to such a degree that it has lost any real meaning.”). 
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having the jural and doctrinal mechanisms of the common law characterized 
as altogether contingent features of the system.236 While a growing body of 
scholars has sought to reverse this trend along the lines suggested by our 
account here, the influence of Legal Realism remains pervasive in American 
legal thinking.237 
Despite its extreme aversion to formal concepts and doctrinal mecha-
nisms, Legal Realism did have important lessons for the study and analysis 
of law. In debunking the idea that legal reasoning could be altogether 
autonomous, or that legal concepts could on their own provide judges with 
answers in individual cases (“mechanical jurisprudence”238), it forced legal 
scholars to look outside of the law for their analysis and to appreciate the 
role that external influences play on the content, meaning, and application 
of the law.239 This lesson is without doubt an important and enduring 
contribution of Legal Realism. Yet, when taken to its extreme, it came to be 
understood as suggesting that legal analysis needed to look entirely to 
external factors to understand the law, and that an internal analysis of the 
law’s own concepts and devices was for the most part a misguided and 
myopic enterprise.240  
The rudimentary lessons of Legal Realism are nevertheless perfectly 
compatible with recognizing an important role for concepts in legal analysis 
and reasoning. As one prominent scholar notes, “there is no necessary 
incompatibility between rigorous analysis of concepts and a realist  
approach.” 241  This presumptively clear divide between the realists and 
formalists—whether real or perceived242—has served to distract from the 
functional role that legal concepts continue to play in common law reasoning 
to this day; a role that nearly six decades of Legal Realist criticism have failed 
to eliminate or even attenuate. The simple point remains that the choice 
between formalism (in the sense of a “mechanical jurisprudence”) and realism 
 
236 For an excellent discussion of these effects, see Fuller, supra note 233. 
237 These scholars are part of the “New Private Law” school of thought. Goldberg, Introduction: 
Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note 231, at 1640 n.1. 
238 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 617-21 (1908). 
239 For an excellent account of Legal Realism and its influence on American legal theory, see 
Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 54-56 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
240 See Fuller, supra note 233, at 443-47. 
241 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 35-36 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
242 See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 13-43 (arguing that “formalism” was almost entirely an 
imaginary movement set up by the Legal Realists to make their point). But see Alfred L. Brophy, 
Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 383, 410 (2013) (reviewing TAMANAHA, supra note 1) 
(characterizing Brian Tamanaha’s claims as “at best misleading; parts are outright wrong”). 
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(in the sense of extreme rule or doctrine skepticism243) as modes of legal 
analysis need not be binary. One can admit a role for legal concepts and 
related doctrinal devices, while simultaneously acknowledging the presence 
and significance of external influences on the meaning and application of 
those concepts and devices. The duality of meaning that we described previ-
ously enables precisely such an intermediate position. It recognizes, on the 
one hand, that the law’s concepts are not just contingent attributes of the 
common law system, and on the other, that they are informed and reconsti-
tuted by ideals and influences from outside the legal system. The mere fact 
that concepts are integral to the system need not endow them with autono-
mous significance to the decisionmaking process. To the contrary, recognizing 
their limited importance in the process of reasoning to a decision in a case 
allows for an important intermediary position between realism and formalism 
as modes of legal analysis. 
In our account, legal concepts are real, in the sense of being endowed 
with a normativity of their own by virtue of their origin in the law, in turn 
enabling them to play an important constraining effect on the form and 
structure of legal reasoning, though not in its actual normative content.244 
Acknowledging their realness by no means requires accepting that they 
exclusively influence decisionmaking. Their constraining effect preserves a 
level of continuity in the law and ensures a chain-novel-like rendering of 
common law decisions.245 The mistake of the extreme Legal Realists lies in 
their inability to recognize that legal concepts can play an important role in 
the mode and style of common law reasoning, without deluding judges and 
lawyers into a belief about their autonomous role.246  
Legal concepts—and the pervasive conceptualism of the common law—
gives Legal Realism a distinctive style of reasoning and argumentation, which 
allows judges to develop an element of continuity with the past, while 
simultaneously enabling individual doctrines to keep up with changing needs 
and preferences. And this is our core point: to the extent that common law 
rule development is judge-made law, developed in a backward-looking process 
 
243 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 
(1988). 
244 See generally Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 215 (2011) (providing an account of the normative content of private law doctrine). 
245 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 228-38 (relating how judges build upon 
prior law to authors building upon the prior stories of other authors). 
246 But see Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline (noting the realist critique that the 
law either could not or should not be formalist), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 975, 979 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003); Cohen, supra note 2, at 821 (arguing 
that formalist reasoning leads to nonsensical results). 
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from the context of individual disputes, conceptualism will remain a core 
attribute of the system.247 Rather than working as a system of active decep-
tion, legal concepts serve the all-important role of grounding common law 
analysis in a common language that has been essential to its persistence over 
time and context. Common law judges who rely on legal concepts are hardly 
delusional or misguided, and certainly do not believe that such concepts are 
wholly autonomous. Legal concepts are instead the vehicle that the common 
law uses to justify judicial lawmaking, which must inevitably balance the past, 
present, and future all at once.248 
Even when they acknowledge a role for legal concepts, prominent accounts 
of common law reasoning view such concepts and their purported meaning as a 
veritable distraction, rather than as an integral part of the system’s machinery. 
Consider Edward Levi’s famous account of legal reasoning.249 A prominent 
Legal Realist, Levi saw common law reasoning as originating in the process of 
analogy.250 Unlike other realists, however, he admitted that legal concepts were 
routinely used in such reasoning. Concepts could thus evolve to have a “limiting 
influence—so much so that the reasoning may even appear to be simply 
deductive.”251 He puts the point most starkly when he therefore notes that 
it is not simply deductive. In the long run a circular motion can be seen. 
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases 
are compared. . . . The second stage is the period when the concept is 
more or less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to classify 
items inside and out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the 
concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear 
that the suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.252 
The centrality of “reasoning by example,” to Levi, causes common law 
courts to eventually realize the futility of their reliance on concepts and 
abandon an established concept altogether in favor of pure analogy.253 As an 
example of this cycle, Levi offers up the series of cases developing the idea 
of “inherently dangerous” products, which culminated in Judge Cardozo’s 
 
247 For the problems associated with common law rule development, see Frederick Schauer, 
Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 458 (1989) (book review). 
248 See Fuller, supra note 233, at 447 (“We shall have gone a long way toward ending the contro-
versy concerning ‘nominalism’ if we can secure recognition for the plain fact that the inner mental 
experience of the individual, however precious and ineffable it may be, is ‘conceptual’.”). 
249 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). 
250 See id. at 5 (“Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things.”). 
251 Id. at 8. 
252 Id. at 8-9. 
253 See id. at 9. Indeed he even argues that when this happens, such concepts embody “no 
meaning.” Id.  
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famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick. 254  Levi argues that Cardozo’s 
expansion of the concept resulted in its complete breakdown, with courts 
then coming to realize the distinct advantage of pure analogical reasoning 
over conceptualism.255 Yet what Levi seems to ignore altogether is that 
Cardozo’s move—and that of later cases—was not simply the abandonment 
of the old concept. It was, instead, the replacement of the old concept with a 
broader and more pervasive one that continues to inform the area of law to 
this day: the concept of the “duty.”256 
Levi’s argument illustrates how theorists who are sympathetic to concepts 
nonetheless see them as a distraction in the overall scheme of common law 
reasoning rather than as integral to the system’s working. While reasoning by 
example may indeed represent the way in which common law courts develop 
and apply the law,257 courts continue to do so through the identification of 
common patterns and ideas in cases, which they invariably come to rely on, 
and develop legal concepts as the jural lenses through which they view the 
facts that produce those very patterns.258 
As Brian Tamanaha has recently argued, much of the Legal Realists’ ire 
against formalism and conceptualism originated in the mistaken belief that the 
common law was somehow wedded to the idea of the declaratory theory of 
lawmaking, according to which judges never make the law themselves but 
merely find the law in past decisions.259 Tamanaha’s evidence shows that even 
in the supposed heyday of formalism, most lawyers and jurists readily  
conceded that common law judges were actively making new law even when 
they were not overtly modifying legal doctrine or replacing old rules with 
newly constructed ones.260 Common law reasoning (both then and now) 
adopts a method that purports to minimize external doctrinal disruption while 
simultaneously reaching results demanded by changing situations and contexts. 
Indeed, it is this disconnect between the minimal (or lack of ) extrinsic change 
and the actual result in individual cases that seems to have produced the harsh 
realist critique of formalism and its reliance on concepts.261 Despite this, as 
Tamanaha rightly points out, “the common law has carried on for centuries 
 
254 See id. at 10-27; see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
255  LEVI, supra note 249, at 24-27. 
256 Goldberg & Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 13, at 1743 (arguing that the 
concept of the duty was at the core of the decision in MacPherson). 
257 For a useful summary, see Grant Lamond, Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law, 34 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 567 (2014). 
258 Indeed, Levi too seems to concede this point. See LEVI, supra note 249, at 8 (“If the society 
has begun to see certain significant similarities or differences, the comparison emerges with a word.”). 
259 See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 13-24. 
260 See id. at 23-24. 
261 See id. at 41. 
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without visible alteration in method,”262 even while undergoing a great deal of 
substantive and normative change. What this points to then is that the  
common law’s reliance on conceptual thinking originates in its very structure 
as a method of judicial lawmaking, which in turn necessitates realizing a 
delicate balance between doctrinal stability and normative change. The rote 
criticism of conceptualism in the common law misses this reality altogether. 
Understanding the persistence of legal concepts in the vocabulary and 
content of common law reasoning thus necessitates treating them as “real” 
and endowed with their own functional significance that judges are aware of 
and readily accept in the interests of continuity in the working of the law. 
Now it might well be true that institutional considerations call into question 
the very virtue of the common law as a method of rule development and 
reasoning, insofar as it is believed that courts are “ill-equipped”263 to make 
law. This is, however, a different question: so long as the common law 
subsists, we contend that it will continue to develop by relying on legal 
concepts. 
B. Facilitating Normative Pluralism 
An additional, important implication that flows from our previous analysis 
relates to the common law’s ability to accommodate a multiplicity of normative 
goals and values. Our analysis of how concepts work and their reliance on a 
duality of meanings suggests that the common law adheres to a model of 
functional pluralism. Unlike structural pluralism, functional pluralism posits 
that common law institutions come to affirm and advance varying—and at 
times, conflicting—normative values. It achieves this not simply by delineating 
separate spheres of influence for each of these goals whereby each value is only 
ever realized within the confines of an individual doctrinal area264 but instead 
by enabling a doctrinal area to embrace different values, varying over time and 
context. The normative meaning of legal concepts thus enables common law 
doctrine to adapt itself to conflicting preferences and contexts, each of which 
might demand a different normative value or ideal.  
The open-endedness of common law concepts (i.e., their open texture) 
should thus be seen as an active invitation from the common law to purveyors 
of different ideals, values, and ideologies, who are called upon to interpret and 
apply these concepts to individual cases and contexts using their preferred 
normative ideal. Over time, these purveyors—value entrepreneurs, so to 
 
262 Id. at 40. 
263 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
264 See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 143, at 1413. 
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speak—who might be either judges, scholars, or lawyers, seek to ensure that 
their chosen normative value comes to be instantiated in the normative 
meaning of a legal concept, and that this instantiation acquires a level of 
relative stability owing to stare decisis and the overall path dependence of 
common law adjudication. Sometimes this entrepreneurship is successful, and 
sometimes it is unsuccessful, especially in the face of openly competing 
considerations. Consider, as an example of the latter, the Hand Formula in 
tort law.265 Despite its advocates, in actual practice (i.e., as applied by courts), 
the Hand Formula has been of limited influence in courts’ construction of the 
normative meaning of the “duty of care” in negligence law.266 In its place, a 
host of other fairness-based considerations seem to be more prevalent in 
courts’ analyses. In this process, divergent considerations and values thus 
compete with each other for salience and affirmation in the reasoning of 
courts, with courts then seeking to resolve this facial incommensurability 
through a process of practical reasoning from within the context of the 
dispute—a hallmark of common law adjudication. 
Incommensurability refers to the idea that plural values are often times 
hard to compare against each other, owing to the lack of a common measure 
along which to undertake the comparison.267 This phenomenon is “more 
apparent in the law than anywhere else,” 268 and the common law in particular 
is often singled out as being especially susceptible to the problem of incom-
mensurability given the range of activities and contexts to which it is applied. 
At the same time though, the common law is also held out by scholars and 
theorists as embodying what is perhaps the best known approach to solving the 
problem of incommensurability: practical reasoning (or practical wisdom).269  
 
265 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the proba-
bility be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”). 
266 See Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 145, 151-52 (2003) (recognizing that even in opinions that purport to apply the test, the 
actual reasoning or results are never based on the test itself ); see also Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. 
Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 683, 699 (2002) (“Courts do not rely heavily on the Hand Formula . . . .”). 
267 See James Griffin, Incommensurability: What’s the Problem? (discussing the various theoretical and 
colloquial ways that “incommensurability” is used), in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 35, 35 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and 
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 795-96 (1994) (positing a definition of incommensurability). 
268 Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1367, 1410 (2001). 
269 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 21 (1995) (noting the “ancient common-law reverence for the virtue of 
practical wisdom,” which entails “a subtle and discriminating sense of how the (often conflicting) 
generalities of legal doctrine should be applied to concrete disputes”); Stephen R. Perry, Judicial 
 
  
2015] Structure and Value in the Common Law 1301 
 
At its simplest, practical reasoning refers to the process of deliberating 
about choices that result in action. Practical reason is “concerned not with 
matters of fact and their explanation, but with matters of value, of what it 
would be desirable to do . . . , [and with making reasoning agents] assess 
and weigh their reasons for action, the considerations that speak for and 
against alternative courses of action that are open to them.”270 To Aristotle, 
practical reasoning was thus reasoning that resulted in, or was directed at 
resulting in, action.271 Given its focus on action, one of the characteristic 
features of practical reasoning is therefore its indelible connection to the 
specifics of the situation necessitating the choice in question.272  
As a solution to incommensurability, practical reasoning therefore adopts 
what philosophers have described as the pragmatic theory of value,273 rooted 
in the idea that “the meaning of a statement is exhausted by its practical 
implications.”274 Accordingly, it entails examining how a given value, when 
applied to a particular situation, produces a set of consequences. The  
decisionmaker must then compare and contrast those consequences to 
examine their overall acceptability. Practical reasoning thus recognizes the 
centrality of making a choice among competing values situationally. As the 
philosopher David Wiggins puts it, practical reason is in the end a “judgment 
that one course of action is better than another,”275 rather than an avoidance 
of such judgment, or an attempt to decide by reference to single value or 
end, referred to as “monism.”276 Practical reasoning is thus indelibly a form 
of pluralism. 
Legal concepts facilitate the process of practical reasoning through their 
duality of meaning. While the jural meaning of a concept operates as structural 
constraint that guides the nature of the court’s inquiry, the normative meaning 
inevitably involves a choice among competing considerations and values, which 
 
Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 220-21 (1987) 
(investigating the nexus between practical reason and precedent).  
270  R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/D8P6-LP52. 
271 See generally NORMAN O. DAHL, PRACTICAL REASON, ARISTOTLE, AND WEAKNESS 
OF THE WILL (1984); M. T. Thornton, Aristotelian Practical Reason, 91 MIND 57 (1982).  
272  See David Wiggins, Incommensurability: Four Proposals, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,  
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 267, at 52, 61-62. 
273 See Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in INCOMMEN-
SURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 267, at 90, 91-95. 
274 Id. at 90.  
275 David Wiggins, Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire, 
79 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y (n.s.) 251, 274 (1979) (emphasis added). 
276  Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND 
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 267, at 1, 16. 
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the court must undertake through the lens of the particular facts involved in 
the case, rather than merely by adhering to some normative pre-commitment. 
Indeed, this reality perhaps explains why some judges, who in their scholarly 
contexts remain committed to certain foundational values, are nonetheless 
openly “pragmatic” and potentially pluralist in their decisionmaking in 
individual cases.277 Practical reasoning in this sense has often been described by 
legal theorists as the nascent “craft” that underlies common law adjudication, 
which helps influence judges’ choice among competing normative ideas 
underlying the working of abstract rules, and in turn the competing normative 
meanings contained in a legal concept.278 Karl Llewellyn described this ideal 
most forcefully in his account of the common law: 
The existence of a craft means the existence of some significant body of 
working knowhow, centered on the doing of some perceptible kind of 
job. . . . [E]very live craft has much more to it than any rules describe; 
the rules not only fail to tell the full tale, taken literally they tell much of it 
wrong; and while words can set forth such facts and needs as ideals, craft-
conscience, and morale, these things are bodied forth, they live and work, 
primarily in ways and attitudes which are much more and better felt and 
done than they are said.279 
The duality of meaning underlying legal concepts reinforces the craft of 
practical reasoning that is central to the working of the common law. It 
compels judges to balance jural and normative meaning, while understanding 
the latter in terms of the normative goals best suited to the particular case at 
hand. Those demands originate from a variety of considerations—situational 
and institutional (e.g., precedent)—and yet allow for the process of choice to 
be reasoned. In this sense, then, the very idea of a concept’s normative  
meaning is determined situationally, in pragmatic and reflective fashion rather 
than in the abstract, or in isolation from the demands of the case. The common 
law, as Holmes famously observed, “decides the case first and determines the 
principle afterwards.”280 Choosing among plural normative considerations in 
 
277 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230-31 (2008) (describing the inevita-
bility of pragmatic adjudication among judges); Levmore, supra note 43, at 1793 (arguing that 
Posner the academic is theoretical, while Posner the judge is a “minimalist”). 
278 See, e.g., ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 4 (2005); Hanoch 
Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 637 (2007). See generally Amnon 
Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 1619 (2007); Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
279 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 214 (1960). 
280 Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter, 
The Early Writings of O. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717, 725 (1931).  
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the common law is therefore a contextual process embedded within the 
interpretation and application of legal doctrines to factual situations and occurs 
on a routine basis through the process of giving normative meaning to legal 
concepts. 
The process of determining the normative meaning of a legal concept is 
rarely ever done in a purely deductive fashion where a court reasons from 
first principles to the individual concept and its application. Instead, the 
process is largely dialogic and moves between the preferred outcome in the 
individual case and the general principle that explains or justifies the 
decision.281 Emily Sherwin describes this “natural reasoning” in the common 
law as a process where “[t]he judge begins with an intuitive judgment about 
the best outcome for the case, then formulates a more general principle that 
supports the initial intuition.”282 Having done this, “[t]he judge then tests 
the principle by considering other instances to which it might apply and 
adjusts both principle and intuition to reach an acceptable accommoda-
tion.”283 Thus the normative meaning of a legal concept takes shape through 
a combination of inductive, deductive, and analogical methods; but it begins 
with the fundamental recognition that the concept—and the doctrine that it 
is embedded within—must play a role in deciding the case at hand. It is, in 
other words, constrained very heavily by the primary purpose for which it is 
being discerned, rather than as a purely philosophical or ideological matter. 
Gleaning the normative meaning of a legal concept to reach a decision is the 
very process of practical reasoning that the common law is believed to 
embody. 
For this reason, legal concepts contribute to a form of practical reasoning 
that is openly pluralist in structure and orientation. Additionally, this  
pluralism—which is functional in nature—is dynamic, rather than static. 
Legal concepts can affirm a multitude of different normative values and ideas 
sequentially, over time and context. Because the triggers of normative 
change—such as changing socioeconomic needs, preferences, or judicial 
predispositions—originate externally to legal doctrine itself, proponents of 
specific normative values and ideals are always at liberty to offer a normative 
account of a legal concept that comports with those values and ideals. This is 
not to suggest that there is no stability whatsoever in the normative meaning 
of concepts over time. To the contrary, institutional attributes of common law 
 
281 See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006) 
(describing and critiquing the dialogic process); Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 919 (2006) (defending the dialogic process). 
282 Emily Sherwin, Common Law Reasoning and Cybertrespass, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE COMMON LAW 252, 258 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
283 Id. 
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decisionmaking ensure that the normative goals of the common law remain 
minimally stable but partake of a dynamism and generativity. Our account 
therefore concretizes the common law’s essential structure as a functionally 
pluralist institution. 
C. Legal Concepts as Anchors in Normative Legal Reasoning 
Our final claim concerns the indispensability of legal concepts to normative 
theorizing in the law. Specifically, we contend that normative theories of law 
cannot proceed in a free-floating manner; rather, they must be moored to 
legal concepts. In our view, it is not accidental that efficiency-minded scholars 
do not simply post a general call to “maximize welfare.” Nor is it surprising 
that theorists who believe that the paramount value is justice do not settle for 
a call to do “what is just.” We posit that any normative discourse of the law or 
legal reforms, typically both will—and should—rely on legal concepts. 
Consider the following example. 
The “Hand Formula,” developed by Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,284 purported to introduce a cost–benefit 
analysis into negligence law and is commonly considered an attempt to move 
the normative orientation of negligence analysis towards efficiency.285 Yet even 
when offering up his famous equation—“B < PL”—Judge Hand categorically 
noted that he was doing so to give content to the very concept of duty, and not 
liability for negligence in the abstract.286 Or, as he observed: “[T]he owner’s 
duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a 
function of three variables.”287 Judge Hand could easily have noted that 
liability for negligence in the abstract derives from his calculus. Instead, he 
characterized his argument in terms of duty, central to the negligence analysis. 
Thus, concepts anchor normative reasoning in the law. 
Our argument echoes the position espoused by John Goldberg and  
Benjamin Zipursky in the context of tort law.288 In their critique of Justice 
Holmes’s skepticism of the concept of duty and William Prosser’s subse-
quent proposal to replace existing negligence doctrine with an open-ended 
cost–benefit analysis that compares alternative liability regimes, Goldberg 
and Zipursky note that the Holmes–Prosser model suffers from several 
 
284 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
285 For leading accounts, see Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 
1015 (1994); Wright, supra note 266. 
286 Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
287 Id. (emphasis added). 
288 See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 13, at 1740-43 (identifying 
problems with the Holmes–Prosser paradigm of negligence liability). 
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deficiencies.289 First, from an institutional standpoint, there is strong reason 
to believe that the legislative and executive branches are better suited to 
engage in policymaking while considering all relevant factors.290 Second, a 
negligence model that is based on open-ended cost–benefit analysis gives rise 
to the specters of arbitrariness, indeterminacy, and doctrinal instability.291 
Furthermore, as they point out, the transformation of negligence law into an 
unconstrained policy analysis “threatens to drain the analytic structure from 
torts.”292 Third, and most importantly, it would sever the crucial connection 
between law, morality, and responsibility, a connection that is vital to the 
successful operation of the law.293 This final point warrants elaboration.  
In a series of articles, Goldberg and Zipursky have mounted a defense of 
the concept of duty by placing it in the broader context of the human 
experience. Legal concepts and norms are deeply rooted in the concept of 
responsibility sustained by social interactions. On this view, law reflects, as 
well as reshapes, “the basic obligations that persons owe to various others as 
they go about their lives.”294 Goldberg and Zipursky maintain that the “law 
is as much education, explication, articulation, and reinforcement as it is 
command or threat.”295 Legal concepts, therefore, are informed by interper-
sonal interactions and daily experiences. They are familiar to individuals 
and entail the same kind of thinking and behavior as required in social and 
personal settings.296 In this view then, legal concepts perform the all-
important role of translating the demands and requirements of social 
interaction into normative ideas that form the basis of the legal system’s 
construction of responsibility and liability. 
In other work, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have advanced a similar 
theory connecting property law to conventional perceptions of morality.297 
They make the dual claim that any sustainable property system must be 
“infused with moral significance”298  and that the U.S. property system 
 
289 Id. at 1753-61. 
290 See id. at 1740. 
291 See id. at 1741. 
292 Id.  
293 See id. at 1742-43. 
294 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 
364, 391-92 (2005). For other work in this vein, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1563 (2006); Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 36; and John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007). 
295 Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, supra note 294, at 392. 
296 See id. at 367. 
297 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849 (2007). 
298 Id. at 1850. 
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embodies a moral perspective at its core.299 Merrill and Smith view property 
as “a device for coordinating both personal and impersonal interactions over 
things.”300 As rights in rem that avail against the rest of the world and turn all 
individuals into duty-bearers vis-à-vis property owners, property rights “must 
be communicated to a wide and disparate group of potential violators,”301 in a 
clear manner impervious to misinterpretation.302 This means that all the 
subjects of a particular legal system must be aware of the restrictions imposed 
upon them by various property doctrines.  
Property can achieve this goal only if its doctrines overlap with widespread 
moral conventions that exist in the relevant community. Merrill and Smith 
proceed to demonstrate their thesis by analyzing various property  
doctrines.303 Like Goldberg and Zipursky, Merrill and Smith highlight the 
interdependence between law and other norms and responsibilities that 
regulate human behavior and actions. For Merrill and Smith, though, morality 
is prior to law, but law—through its legal devices and concepts—is seen to 
play the role again of converting the ideals of social and conventional morality 
into independent legal constraints.  
But the problem with free-floating decisionmaking free of doctrinal  
constraints runs even deeper. Even if it were in principle desirable for courts 
and individual actors to engage in abstract policy analysis, it would likely be 
impracticable. As Herbert Simon famously noted, individuals cannot be 
reasonably expected to evaluate all the possible outcomes of a policy or legal 
rule because individuals do not have access to all the relevant information, and 
they could not process and evaluate it if they did.304 As a result, individuals 
often rely on heuristics when facing complex choices.305 Heuristics allow  
decisionmakers to make mental shortcuts that simplify complex decisions. 
The use of heuristics is not limited to financial or economic decisions. 
Heuristics have been shown to guide individuals when they are faced with 
 
299 See id. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 See id.  
303 See id. at 1871-84. 
304 See HERBERT A. SIMON, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice (describing the implausibly 
rigorous cognitive demands of calculating the most rational choice), in MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL 
AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL 
SETTING 241, 244-48 (5th prtg. 1967). 
305 See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US 
SMART (1999) (exploring the use of heuristics in a variety of contexts). 
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moral dilemmas.306 Similarly, heuristics have been posited to play a significant 
role in the law.307  
The common law’s concepts serve as heuristics that facilitate deci-
sionmaking by individual actors and judges within the common law system. 
Consider once again the concept of “reasonableness.” While actors may not 
have the mental resources or the information to arrive at ideal philosophical 
solutions that take into account all possible outcomes and justice  
considerations, individuals can still figure out what constitutes reasonable 
behavior in a particular set of circumstances. They understand that the law or 
rule is asking for a normative evaluation of an action or outcome based on the 
individual’s own internal calculus. Similarly, actors have a plausible sense of 
what “good faith” means based on their everyday interactions and general life 
experience. At the very least, actors can determine what kinds of behavior in 
their opinion amount to “bad faith” and avoid them.  
The principal virtue of heuristics is also their main vice. While some 
scholars have lauded the use of heuristics, explaining that they enable fast 
decisionmaking and lead to largely accurate decisions, others critique  
heuristics’ tendency to oversimplify complex problems and lead individuals to 
answer the wrong question. In moral contexts, some scholars are even more 
openly critical of the use of heuristics.308 Sunstein, for example, argues that 
the use of heuristics often leads us astray by blinding us to the possibility of 
better, though more complex, solutions to moral problems.309 This criticism of 
heuristics largely misses the point. Heuristic-based decisionmaking was born 
out of necessity. In an ideal world, actors could be expected to immerse 
themselves in the difficult dilemmas of moral philosophy or welfarism. In the 
real world, actors do not have the resources or mental capacity to do so. As 
Simon famously observed, we do not optimize; we satisfice, that is, we reach 
decisions that are good enough.310  
 
306 See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005) 
(providing examples of the use of heuristics to guide moral decisionmaking). 
307 See generally HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006) 
(collecting literature on the use of heuristics in the law); MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS 
DEBATE (2011) (discussing the legal implications of the debate between those who characterize 
heuristics as an error-producing form of bias and those who view them as a tool for fast and frugal 
decisionmaking). 
308 See generally, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law (noting that heuristics 
in the law may prevent actors from maximizing their utility or reduce the effectiveness of policy 
incentives), in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 307, at 45.  
309 See generally Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, supra note 306. But see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, 
Heuristics, Biases, and Philosophy, 43 TULSA L. REV. 865 (2007) (critiquing Sunstein’s arguments). 
310 SIMON, supra note 304, at 261 (distinguishing satisficing from optimizing and maximizing). 
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The question thus becomes: are our legal heuristics good enough, or can 
they be improved? Let us be clear that we do not argue that common law 
concepts—insofar as they function as heuristic devices—are perfect. We 
readily admit the possibility that some common law concepts could have 
been substituted by other concepts that can better function as heuristics. 
Indeed, as we discussed previously, some legal concepts are deemphasized 
over time and others are practically abandoned or retired. Likewise, the 
normative meaning of common law concepts is routinely reshaped and 
updated. Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that legislatures and judges 
could devise better legal heuristics. Indeed, we see the generative perfec-
tionism of the common law as striving to achieve this ideal. 
Our claim is therefore hardly that the heuristic function of the law’s  
existing concepts is perfect; indeed it is far more modest. In keeping with 
Simon’s idea of satisficing, we suggest that common law concepts constitute 
heuristics that allow individuals and courts to reach satisfactory, albeit at 
times imperfect, decisions. Common law concepts have survived the test of 
time. They embody centuries of legal experience and closely approximate 
the values of our society. Moreover, thanks to their unchanging jural 
meaning, they constitute clear guideposts for the individual members of our 
society. As far as courts are concerned, concepts contain the lore of multiple 
judicial decisions. Judges, when faced with a new case, frame the facts 
involved around the legal issues that they identify and for which the  
common law’s conceptual machinery provides them with a useful and 
effective toolkit. The existence of these concepts not only ensures certainty 
and continuity in the law but also allows the system to operate efficiently. If 
judges had to approach every case afresh, without any judicial baselines or 
reference points, they would have to act not only as judges but also as 
legislators. Judges simply do not have the mental and material resources to 
perform this task. Such a system would also increase the number of appeals 
and require appellate courts to approach every case de novo. A major 
implication that therefore flows from our account is the recognition that 
normative proposals to reform and modify the law would do well to rely on 
the conceptual architecture of the law.311 
It bears emphasizing that in claiming that legal concepts work as heuristic 
devices in legal reasoning, we should not be taken to suggest that concepts 
perform an exclusively instrumental role and are therefore not endowed with 
 
311 This is not to say that all normative theories of the law must have a bottom-up structure 
in the sense that they must grow out of the common law concepts. It is equally possible to start 
with an abstract top-down theory, but at some point a normative theory should address how it is to 
be operationalized through the conceptual machinery of the law. 
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internal meaning of their own. Quite to the contrary, our claim here is that 
their very ability to function as heuristics derives in large part from their 
being endowed with their own meaning, as a result of which actors and 
judges use them to situate and ground their normative reasoning in the 
law.312 Indeed our claim here is that the very jural meaning of legal concepts, 
which remain sufficiently stable over time, functions as a heuristic device that 
enables courts and litigants to rationalize the facts involved in their dispute 
into particular patterns and ideas, evaluate them, and undertake a process of 
reasoning and decisionmaking. The grounding effect of legal concepts as 
heuristic devices is therefore very much tied to the reality that they do 
embody their own discernible meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing during the heyday of Legal Realism, the noted legal theorist 
Lon Fuller, himself a realist, cautioned scholars that the “crusade against” 
conceptual thinking in the law was going “too far.”313 Fuller’s cautionary note 
seems to have had little influence on American common law thinking, where 
the use and analysis of legal concepts continues to be vilified.314 Indeed, on 
occasion, even the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have criticized concep-
tual thinking (or “conceptualism”), deriding it as “obsolete”315 and “long ago 
discarded.”316 Much of this ire, we have sought to show, originates in a 
fundamental misunderstanding about the role of legal concepts in the  
common law. 
As we have argued, admitting a role for concepts in legal reasoning and 
analysis does not collapse into a formalist enterprise, contrary to common 
understanding. By virtue of their “duality of meaning,” legal concepts—
much like most other elements of legal reasoning—remain open to being 
infused with normative values and ideals from a wide range of disciplines, 
ideologies, and perspectives. All the same, this process does not drain them 
of all meaning, for they continue to embody at all times a core structural 
framework that gives them a determinate jural content across time, place, 
and context. We characterized the former as the concept’s normative 
 
312 For prior efforts to understand the role of concepts through the lens of heuristics and 
information-processing, see Smith, supra note 47.  
313 Fuller, supra note 233, at 443. 
314 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 55-56 (2004) (describing the classical revival of laws as a “conceptual 
regress”). 
315 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 354 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
316 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958). 
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meaning, and the latter as its jural meaning. It is only when the two are seen 
as equally indispensable elements of a concept’s “meaning” that the true role 
of legal concepts in the common law becomes apparent. 
The duality of meaning that underlies legal concepts holds deep functional 
significance in the common law. As we have shown, it is entirely through the 
duality of meaning that the common law is able to maintain its delicate balance 
between stability and change. The jural meaning of concepts allows the 
common law’s doctrinal content to remain relatively stable and unchanging 
over time, while their normative meaning allows it to affirm and endorse 
competing normative values, in the process enabling the common law to keep 
up with changing social preferences. 
Indeed, a central element of our argument has been that understanding 
the common law’s conceptual architecture is critical to appreciating not just 
how the common law works but, in addition, what the common law actually is. 
As a method (and body) of judge-made law, developed from the context of 
individual cases with uniquely different fact patterns and normative demands, 
the common law requires a textured approach to legal rules and reasoning that 
allows it to provide future actors with sufficient guidance and predictability, 
while at the same time decide the individual case at hand by reference to 
existing law. Legal concepts offer common law courts and judges an ideal 
mechanism by which to realize these twin goals without undermining the 
overall legitimacy of the legal system. It is in fact the common law’s conceptual 
framework that is, in large part, responsible for its vitality as a method of 
lawmaking and legal reasoning for several centuries now. 
The renowned common law theorist Sir Frederick Pollock famously tried to 
identify the “genius of the common law” in a series of lectures delivered at the 
turn of the century.317 Pollock identified a host of characteristics that he 
believed explained the subsistence, expansion, and continuing vitality of the 
common law as a body of law. As a method of lawmaking and legal reasoning, 
though, the true genius of the common law is perhaps to be found in its 
undying commitment to its conceptual edifice, which has survived the test of 
time and outlived the diatribes of its critics. In the end, rather than representing 
a form of “transcendental nonsense,” as Felix Cohen famously put it, legal 
concepts in the common law exhibit a lure, simplicity, and indefatigability that 
can be explained only by their “transcendent common sense.”  
 
 
317 See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW (1912). 
